The Rise and Rise of Charedi Judaism

One of the most visible—and one of the most unexpected—trends in the Jewish world in recent years has been the growth of Charedi Judaism, that is, of what is often described as “Ultra Orthodox Judaism”, by Jews who practise the most stringent forms of Orthodox Judaism to the letter, live in what might be termed closed communities, dress distinctively, and as far as possible isolate themselves from the outside world and its secular trends. (The term “Charedi”, meaning God-fearing, will generally be used here, and occasionally “Strictly Orthodox”, as neutral terms. The term “Ultra Orthodox” will not be used.)

This essay appeared in our January 2023 edition.
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The growth of the Charedi community since the Second World War has been truly extraordinary. In 1939, on the eve of the Holocaust, there were probably no more than a million to one and a half million Charedi Jews in the world, generally in the rural parts of Poland, Hungary and Romania, although also in heavily Jewish cities and towns in these areas. In the Western world, with exceptions, Jews were not strictly observant, did not dress distinctively, or, as a rule, attend separate Jewish schools or practise those customs which mark the Charedim as distinctive; indeed, in the Western world, the aim of most Jews was to blend in and be assimilated within a generation or two, becoming equal citizens who fully participated in public life, without losing their Jewish religion and traditions. In the Soviet Union, any evidence of Jewish religiosity was vigorously suppressed. Before 1939, there were virtually no Charedi rabbis in New York or other cities in the West with large Jewish populations, and no more than skeletal Charedi communities. The situation in Palestine was similar, with many pioneers of Zionism being almost entirely secular.

The Holocaust saw the destruction of nearly all of the centres of Charedi life in Central and Eastern Europe. Although accurate figures are scarce, it has been estimated that there were only about 25,000 to 35,000 Charedi Jews in Israel when it became independent in 1948, many of whom were recently arrived Holocaust survivors from Europe. David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, exempted yeshivah students (male students at Charedi religious schools) from military service because there were so few left. In 1945, their numbers in New York were almost certainly no larger, and they were virtually non-existent elsewhere. Many observers would have assumed that Charedi Jews were a relic of pre-modern culture, and the few survivors would inevitably disappear through assimilation within a few decades.

But precisely the opposite has happened, and in the most emphatic way imaginable. There are now about 1.8 million Charedi Jews in the world: an estimated 1,175,000 in Israel, and around 600,000 or so elsewhere, especially in New York City and its suburbs. Through early marriages, large families, and little or no intermarriage or “dropouts”, their growth rate is so rapid that demographers expect their numbers to double every sixteen years. In Israel, their numbers are expected to total 2.6 million by 2030, and reach 6.2 million by 2064—only forty-one years from today—to comprise 40 per cent of Israel’s Jewish population.

The growth of Charedi numbers in Israel is remarkable, but not inexplicable in an explicitly Jewish nation in which the Charedi receive special benefits, such as exemption from military service. My principal aim here is to focus on Charedi Judaism elsewhere, especially in the United States, and attempt to account for its extraordinary growth there, which has been unaided by government help or benefits. If one wants to gain an insight into just how vast has been the growth in their numbers, I recommend viewing, on YouTube, the funeral procession of Rabbi Yisroel Avraham Portugal, known as the “Skulener Rebbe”, which took place in Borough Park, Brooklyn, in 2019. Portugal (1923–2019) was an eminent rabbinical scholar and leader who survived the Holocaust and re-established his movement in New York. An estimated 100,000 persons attended his funeral procession, apparently the largest Jewish funeral ever known in the United States. Watch “Largest Jewish Funeral in American History—Levaya [funeral] of Skulener Rebbe” below.

The streets of this heavily Jewish neighbourhood in New York were lined by a crowd of endless size—such as one might expect to find at the MCG on Grand Final day, if it offered free admission and free beer—composed exclusively of adult Charedi men in their distinctive dress; no women or boys under thirteen were present, which means that the crowd represented only 40 per cent or so of its potential size. Had a rebbe of similar eminence died in Brooklyn in 1950, or even in 1975, the crowd at his funeral would have been only a small fraction of the size which the growth of Charedi Judaism has brought about.

Most American Charedim live in New York, especially in three non-contiguous neighbourhoods in Brooklyn, and in several newly established communities in suburban New York and New Jersey. Although they practise a severe and strict form of Judaism, and attempt to be entirely closed to negative outside influences of any kind, it is important to note that they do this, successfully, in New York, probably the world’s media, publishing and higher learning capital, not in some distant rural backwater where fundamentalism is the rule, and in the midst of a very large Jewish community which is notable for its left-liberalism in politics and non-orthodoxy in religion.

To accomplish this they maintain an ever-growing private school system, and strictly forbid unmonitored television, the internet, or unacceptable publications of any kind, as well as literally any contact between men and women outside of married family relationships. Teaching in their schools includes only a minimum of non-religious subjects for boys, whose instruction centres almost wholly around the full-time study of traditional Jewish texts in Hebrew, the Torah, the Talmud, and rabbinical commentators. (Girls have a more secular-oriented education, entirely separate from boys.) The traditional role of women is clearly vital to the great success of the movement. Girls generally marry as teenagers, and then have, by today’s standards, very large families.

So far as possible, no nexus is allowed with the non-Charedi world, either Jewish or gentile. One online clip which makes this strikingly clear is “Walking Hasidic Jewish Community of Williamsburg Brooklyn During Hanukkah 2020”, filmed by “Action Kid”. (Hanukkah is a week-long Jewish holiday, held in 2020 in late November and early December.) “Action Kid” is a young man who walks through various neighbourhoods in New York, recording what he sees on continuous videos. This video is thirty-two minutes long. One commentator noted “119 baby strollers in 32 minutes”, having counted all of them. Despite living in ultra-liberal New York, Charedi women are apparently happy to live a lifestyle diametrically opposed to that of secular New Yorkers; indeed, in complete contrast with the lifestyle and orientation of non-Charedi Jews in New York and elsewhere, with their central role in art and culture, including the avant-garde, and immersion in left-liberal politics.

Rather than hiding in anonymity, or dwelling in some remote community unvisited by outsiders, Charedi Jews are among the most visible and distinctive component of New York’s population. Men wear unique and highly distinctive clothing. Most speak Yiddish, the language of East European Jews before the Holocaust, rather than English or even Hebrew, the language of today’s Israel (to which it is linguistically unrelated, although both are written in Hebrew letters). They live in distinct, ghetto-like areas, in particular in Williamsburg, Crown Heights and Borough Park in Brooklyn, and in offspring communities near New York City.

All this raises two interesting questions. How on earth, and why, has this massive growth occurred, at a time of rampant secularisation and greatly increased irreligion throughout the Western world? And, are the Charedim unique, or is it possible to imagine their success being duplicated by other groups in the Western world, even in Australia? It is not easy to give a cogent answer to the first question, and I am not familiar with any compelling sociological theories which explain their success. The Charedim do not have a single acknowledged grand ruler like the Pope, but dozens of rebbes (as they are known), heads of separate strands within Strict Orthodoxy, whose leadership of their movements is often hereditary. The Jewish sense of “chosenness” certainly enhances the attraction of these movements to young men looking for a direction and purpose in life. Once they enter Charedi Judaism, they join a tightly-knit world with only internal references and linkages, where very large families—the average Charedi couple has seven children—are the rule, and whose own children are also wholly immersed in this world from birth, marry young, and then have their own large families.

The existence of the State of Israel, with its state-sponsored support for the Charedim, and its miraculous rebirth and continuing existence despite its many enemies, seemingly evidence of divine guidance, further validates the movement. Most Charedi communities and activities before the Holocaust were found in rural and semi-rural parts of Eastern and Central Europe, possibly because the strength of anti-Semitism prevented the full acceptance of Jews in urban areas and in the full civic life of their countries. In contrast, today’s Charedi communities are to be found in the most sophisticated urban areas. The decline of anti-Semitism makes it possible for them to appear utterly different and distinctive from the rest of the population without arousing hostility and to live their separate lifestyles in full view. Yet, even taken together, these do not fully explain the extraordinary success of the Charedim, especially as many are entirely cut off from all other aspects of contemporary life—the media, entertainment, sport, teenage coming-of-age patterns—which the rest of the population takes for granted and would not readily give up.

The second question, whether other religious-based groups and movements in the West might duplicate their success, at a time of the endemic decline in religious belief and attendance at religious services, is even more difficult to answer. In 2016, 40 per cent of the Australian population claimed to have “no religion”, “secular beliefs”, or gave “religion not stated” as their response to the census question on religion. In the UK, a 2018 British Social Attitudes survey on religion, based on a random sample of 3879 adults, found that 52 per cent claimed to have “no religion”, and 38 per cent stated that they were “Christians”. In 2014 weekly attendance at Church of England services dropped below one million for the first time.

There are a number of parallels to the Charedim, at least in the United States, which might suggest that it is possible for other religious groups to enjoy similar success. Most interesting are the Amish, the German-origin Protestants, mainly in Pennsylvania, who also dress distinctively and are best known for eschewing automobiles, radio, television and the internet. The parallels between the two groups are so striking that the uninformed sometimes assume there is a linkage of some kind between them: of course, there is none, apart from a common origin in pre-modern Central and Eastern Europe. Strikingly, as with the Charedim, the number of Amish has grown significantly in recent decades, from an estimated 128,150 in 1992 to 350,665 in 2020, and from the same causes: very high birth rates and very low loss rates via “dropouts”.

Other small endogenous Western groups may also have experienced similar recent growth. However, it seems clear that they are exceptions to a general rule of religious decline in the West. It may, however, be that a deliberate, concerted effort by a charismatic leader or leaders, producing a large number of permanent followers who withdraw comprehensively from many of the accepted dimensions of established society, may be able to negate the general rule of religious decline. The already existing religions may also experience a growth, as apparently happened in the 1950s. It will be interesting to see if anything of this kind occurs. Stranger things have happened.

William D. Rubinstein held chairs of history at Deakin University and at the University of Wales