The Election Outcome

THE RESULT of the November 24 general election came as no surprise, though the polls if anything turned out rather more accurately than was anticipated. But it seemed pretty much time for a change of government, other things being equal, and this duly took place. It is possible that the Howard government could have been returned if the Coalition’s campaign had been better conducted, but this was unlikely. Even so it is worth remembering that despite all the seeming inevitability it was a close margin. There is plenty of rejoicing amongst the Howard haters, and crowing about in particular Howard’s loss of his own seat, but the defeat was not the humiliating rebuff that its deliverers would have wished.

However, it has to be said that it was a great mistake of John Howard’s to insist on fighting through to the bitter end. It is not at all certain that Peter Costello would have won the election if he had taken the reins—but the overall result for the Coalition would have been very much less humiliating than it was. If Howard had retired from the prime ministership after completing his decennial in 2006 he would have left covered in glory; and Costello would at least have had a year or so to attempt to consolidate his position. Even to have lost honourably towards the end of 2007 would have been a better position for both Howard and Costello.

Howard’s behaviour throughout 2007 can only be characterised as hubris, and he can only be personally blamed for this. Whom the gods would destroy … This is a pity, since the former prime minister’s record remains permanently stained, and his record in government only able to be discussed through this defect. Most of the petty triumphalism of the post-election period will dissipate, and John Howard’s record will be able to be subjected to reasonably objective analysis, though the usual defamations will be liberally applied. Again, the former prime minister has himself to blame for not having chosen a better time to leave office. Nevertheless he showed considerable grace in the manner of his conceding office; grace which had never been shown by his immediate predecessor in the job.

Kevin Rudd is as yet an unknown quantity, as is most of his front bench. The new Prime Minister throughout the election campaign emphasised his own conservatism, especially in economic matters. Much the same was true of the new Treasurer, Wayne Swan. At this early stage the new Labor government looks a lot like the Hawke Labor government before Keating’s grab for power—overall, an effective, reformist government introducing many of the reforms which the Fraser government should have introduced but for various reasons, in particular Fraser’s sheer stupidity, did not. Like Hawke Labor, Rudd proposes to dwell on fiscal responsibility as well as overall monetary soundness. Despite the scheming of backwoodsmen like Senator Kim Carr, most of the economic ministers seem solidly against a reversion to tariffs and other protective devices.

All this sounds very promising. But we are really guaranteed only about a year of the first Rudd government. After that the shape of the government is likely to change quite substantially. In effect, the composition of the ministry is mainly that of Kim Beazley’s shadow ministry. But although the Coalition’s message was conveyed quite crudely, it was all the same correct about the heavy emphasis in the new government on people more or less directly derived from the trade union movement. From the beginning the ALP caucus will be dominated by unionists (especially in the Senate). More importantly it will contain a substantial number of heavyweight unionists who will soon insist on making their voices heard. Many of these are temporarily parked as parliamentary secretaries, but will be expecting to see radical promotion within a year. That will be the first big stir amongst the new government, when a good deal of the remaining dead wood of the old Beazley regime will be finally shed.

It will be the real test for Rudd, also. Whether he will be able to keep control of his government once the union barons begin to flex their muscles, whether he will be able to continue with the conservative policies he has promised, whether he will be able to continue to implement a policy of labour market reform will be in question; above all whether Rudd will have the strength to continue his essentially rationalist position and implement the kind of bureaucratic policies which he seems to espouse will have to be seen. It will be easy enough for him to reject the previous government’s workplace relations policy, since this was a total mess from the beginning, and every amendment to it made it worse. So long however as he does this without returning labour markets to the kind of sclerosis and union power base that they had developed this could only be a good thing. What will eventuate cannot be confidently predicted. Given the much greater sophistication of the union barons who have now entered parliament the outcome may be quite desirable—the thugs who have dominated a few unions will not necessarily determine the outcome.

It remains to be seen what Julia Gillard’s role in all this will be. It may be that Rudd has deliberately overloaded her with work: education, employment, workplace relations and social inclusion will be a heavy burden. Either she will have to slide some of it off onto others, or she will escape Rudd’s control altogether. Either way could have a chaotic result, and unless Rudd is a really first-rate bureaucrat it could be the beginning of his government sliding into chaos along the lines of the Whitlam government.

Then there is going to be the disillusionment of the loyal troops. As became clear from the vote, the new government’s majority is not great, and the recovery of votes from the Coalition to Labor in the outer suburban seats not so great as to ensure a majority for Labor even next time. The next election is likely to be close also. However, this will not be kept in mind by the middle-class inner-urban voters who see themselves as the determinants and moving spirits of the last election campaign. They have already forgotten that the election was not theirs to determine.

Already the media and the chattering classes generally are talking as if they were the chief actors in the election. Increasingly these groups will speak as if the new government is their own creature, and obliged to follow their own agenda. This has already been the case in Bali, when Rudd has already felt a current of criticism beginning to rise around his refusal to adopt totally irrational greenhouse policies. It is clear that as far as the Labor Party membership is concerned (that is, the minority of inner-urban activists) Australia’s foreign policy should be formulated mainly around climate change, Iraq withdrawal, and opposition to Japanese whaling—a total irrelevancy. The universities will once more see themselves as the advisers of the nation, and their “public intellectuals”, no longer having John Howard available as main whipping boy, will find themselves turning to fine sectarian divisions between Right and Left in the Labor caucus. The climate of debate about government policy will rapidly become more acerbic, with Labor Left and Greens taking ever more hostile positions to the government policy of the day.

This would not matter more than usual, except that a Labor government subsisting on a thin majority might find itself under threat from a discontented working-class outer-suburban population. It is by no means certain that a continued din of media propaganda would, in the absence of the Workplace Relations Act, ensure a continued anti-Coalition vote. At the very least Rudd is going to find himself dealing with a torrent of criticism from his supposed friends, especially the Greens (who have no sense) and the bourgeois Labor Left.

MUCH WILL DEPEND on how the Coalition parties respond to the defeat of November. It is the wont of parties in defeat to become demoralised, with malcontents of various kinds voicing the complaints they have hitherto suppressed, or lightly throwing aside the party policies they had apparently loyally been echoing right up to the election. And while there is no doubt that the Workplace Relations Act was misconceived in its actuality, its intention was generally directed towards a useful goal, deregulation of the labour market. It is simply not the case that the underpinning of the award system or union domination of workplaces is necessary and desirable. This has not prevented a number of Opposition members disowning the policy which only a few weeks ago was the central plank in the then government’s platform.

This is a fairly usual tendency for parties in the first stages of adjustment to loss of power. But it ought not to be allowed to be conducted in a totally undisciplined manner—by all means change party policy, but it is mistaken to cut and run in panic in all directions. This is particularly the case with climate warming, which should be approached as a possibility, even a probability, but in a rational manner.

It is clear that an effective leader can make his party’s policy, as Rudd did during the election campaign, but policy ought not from the beginning be made by a single policy maker until he has proven himself effective. So far none of the Liberal leaders, actual or prospective, has yet shown any particular aptitude for this. None of the National/Country Party leaders has ever shown any leadership talent on the level above the thug or the ward heeler—with the possible exception of John Anderson. Certainly the well-remembered “Black Jack” McEwen was nothing but a thug, as he was depicted by Paul Hasluck in a famous memoir.

After every election the prospect for the defeated party looks hopeless. But in fact in federal elections at least this is not at all true. Even after the Labor Split and the formation of the Democratic Labor Party the prospect for Labor was not nearly as hopeless as it seemed for much of the time. Just before the split there was a good chance that Labor could have won the 1954 election, but it was guaranteed defeat by the antics of Dr Evatt, both by way of wild electoral promises and by his hysterical response to the Petrov Commission. The subsequent split was precipitated by Evatt. Even then, with the Labor Party in disarray and the DLP solidly throwing its preferences behind the Liberals, in 1961 Labor lost the election by only one seat—a period of merely seven years. The next interval was longer, eleven years. The Whitlam government was cut short; but even so Labor was only another eight years out of office. Then thirteen years of Labor, then eleven years of the Coalition.

The basic pattern is that in normal circumstances government can be expected to change hands federally every two or three terms. This need not be especially depressing for even those in their early fifties, who can have some prospect of gaining office again. If John Howard has demonstrated one thing, it is the importance of maintaining fitness in office. He was in no way impaired, despite much of the denigration directed towards him. Thus there are half a dozen potential Liberal leaders including the actual one; there are already a number of abler younger members coming up. These will be supplemented by newly selected members who will replace older sitting members—not just those who want to resign, but those who ought to be forced to resign if they are clearly past their usefulness.

Which brings us to the urgency of reform of the Liberals. Andrew Robb is the ideal person to head up the task of trying to bring some coherence in a party in which it is long overdue. While there is a good case to be made for party autonomy in the state sense, this should not be identified with autonomy in federal affairs. Preselection for federal seats should be governed by federal party structures alone, as should all the affairs of the party federally. This is of course easier said than done, since there will be strong resistance from many of the present power groupings to anything which might reduce their current influence, no matter how trivial. All state parties and factions from time to time have shown an inclination to cosset their own immediate power regardless of the damage which is done to the party as a whole. It is clear that in the case of state Liberal parties this sometimes reaches a totally dysfunctional degree; no more than in Queensland.

It is by no means sure how serious the problem of the Right is in New South Wales—this seems to be as much an invention of the media as reality. However, it is clear that in the past there was an attempt by the Left of the party (the so-called “Group”) to effect a total takeover which would have converted the Liberals into a kind of bourgeois Labor Party (but Labor itself has managed that). Undoubtedly the backlash has been overdone.

The most difficult thing for many political activists is to accept that not everybody can be expected to be in agreement; there must be a diversity of views within a wide spectrum. Much of the squabbling however is, as always, about personal power and influence. It is easy enough to design a new federal structure for the Liberals, indeed it is a matter of recasting a few structures. The problem is to put such structures into force, and this will require a considerable effort on behalf of those assigned the task. Indeed, it requires a kind of strong leadership which is perhaps not appropriate to a front-line leader but essential to the task of reorganisation. This is something which cannot be delayed too long into the first or second term, since the party will tend always to demoralisation. In the past the Liberals have had some strong organisational leaders, of whom the late Senator Carrick springs to mind; they need two or three such now.

In general, it is one of the healthier attributes of the Australian political system that at most times power has been able to change hands fairly easily and regularly and at not too great intervals. It is incumbent on the political parties if they are doing their job properly that this should continue to be so, and that the parties should be actively engaged in debating policy. It is ironic that the Labor Party has always taken far more advantage of policy discussion emanating from bodies like the Centre of Policy Studies than has the Liberal Party, which might seem to have a greater interest in its ideas.