Submarines and All That

Australia is a maritime nation with a continental mindset.
— Rear Admiral Peter Sinclair, former Governor of New South Wales

The 2009 defence white paper committed the government to acquiring twelve new submarines to replace the existing six Collins-class boats that have now reached on average half their operational life of around twenty-five years. The new submarines are supposed to be built by 2030 but at the time of writing an announcement of the specific type selected has been promised “shortly” and “within weeks”. In any case, the 2013 Budget cuts to the defence forward estimates and the transfer of committed funds from capital equipment programs to current expenditure mean that the 2009 document is dead in the water. The government has announced that a new white paper will be published in 2013.

Defence white papers in Australia have a dismal history. Every program set out in the white papers of 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000 and 2009 was substantially reduced sooner rather than later, usually because the funding was not forthcoming. Thus, despite the white paper being a government-endorsed document, the government offered no more than a rhetorical commitment to the program’s implementation. Similar programs set out in Professor Paul Dibb’s defence policy review in 1986 and a force structure review in 1991 were similarly abandoned, delayed or substantially under-funded, except where they involved reductions in existing capabilities. The production of such documents has become a bureaucratic industry so isolated from reality that the senior public servant who wrote the 2000 white paper reportedly told the professional military staff that he did not want their advice! There can be no confidence that the putative 2013 document, if it sees the light of day before 2014, will be any better unless it involves reductions in defence capability. Historically as well as currently, it is very difficult to perceive any serious political interest in national security. If nothing else this represents an astonishing degree of national immaturity if not outright negligence.

The published versions of the white papers tend to be bland in the extreme where they are not naive. The discussion of the strategic environment is almost invariably based upon uncertainties and possibilities, usually worded to avoid upsetting Australia’s neighbours. Some of those, China for example, are well able to read between the lines and they take offence anyway if they choose to do so. Some current media reports claim that the classified version of the 2009 white paper argues that Australia must prepare for major war with China; if this is true it suggests that the document should be treated with even greater suspicion. Of course war with China is a possibility but only in a context in which the United States would be involved directly, with Australia—and probably Japan and others—in support. That direct attacks on Australia could occur in the course of such a conflict is also possible but China’s capacity for such attacks is limited. Even then they would necessarily be indirect rather than involving invasion of the mainland, the everlasting bogey of the defence debate. Long-range missile attacks on Australia would be possible if China were to focus its limited abilities on a peripheral player like Australia rather than the main enemy, the United States. Such an all-out war would be more damaging to China’s interests than to America’s or even Australia’s. In an age of globalisation, such struggles for survival are arguably dead because there can be no winners. Speculating about future conflicts consumes inordinate quantities of paper but generates very little light.

I have argued as far back as 1986 in my book To Live in Peace that an approach to Australia’s defence strategy should be driven not by identifying potential enemies but by identifying our national security interests and their vulnerabilities: in other words, what we must protect and how, in the light of known and projected military capabilities, they should be protected. Identifying an aggressor within a useful time-frame is just not possible. The different approach removes a substantial range of uncertainties, allowing then a more rational approach to strategy and to force structure planning. At the very least such an approach would drive a recognition that Australia cannot be secured simply by defending against invasion.

Australia’s economy and the livelihood of all Australians depend, as they have since 1788, upon overseas trade. If we do not contribute to the protection of that trade, as we are doing on a small scale today as far away as the Gulf of Aden against pirates, we risk losing it. Some allegedly sophisticated analysts have argued that, in extremis, Australia is self-sufficient. That is a straw-man argument; the political fallout from a serious increase in unemployment or even the unavailability of a range of consumer items that we don’t make here would force a surrender to whatever coercive demands arose from the loss of trade. In any case, the international response to an aggressor would be such as to isolate him rather than Australia. Strategic debate in Australia has ever clung to the notion of defending our mainland against invasion, despite the reality that our military engagements have always been in defence of wider interests. Strangely there has never been any serious discussion in Australia of just what our vital interests are despite the fact that this should be a matter for open public discussion.

In these circumstances and in the context of sharp cuts in the forward estimates for defence, the question needs to be asked whether any Australian government and its dysfunctional defence organisation can produce an adequate defence force. For the 2012–13 financial year, the defence budget has been cut in real terms by 10.5 per cent to $24.2 billion. The forward estimates for defence have been cut by $5.5 billion over four years and a further $2.9 billion has been redirected from new equipment purchases to current expenditure to cope with increasing costs, mainly to fix problems that have accumulated. Defence expenditure for the year will amount to no more than 1.56 per cent of GDP, the lowest since 1938, and 6.65 per cent of the $376 billion budget compared with the normal but itself inadequate level of 8 to 10 per cent of the past three decades or so. By contrast, health, education and welfare spending now gobble up 59 per cent of all federal outlays, with these areas showing persistent growth and leaving government with few options for meeting the national security needs that constitute its primary rationale.

The defence budget reduction has attracted only limited comment, most of it critical but generally lost in the tsunami of comment on such politically engaging issues as Craig Thomson’s alleged misbehaviour, cash handouts (of individually small amounts) to millions and the political future of the government over the next twelve months (or is it weeks?). It’s all very exciting for political groupies but it also means that Australia’s defence will face some critical and unavoidable capability gaps from about 2020—in addition, of course, to those that now exist.

Given the volatility of international security relations since the end of the Cold War, a responsible government needs to provide continuously for an Australian Defence Force to be available to meet the government’s usually unpredictable requirements over at least twenty years. This is a matter of national insurance, the same insurance that most Australians pay to secure their homes and key assets—and most pay a much larger proportion of their income than does the Australian government. More importantly, the government at any time is a trustee to ensure that future governments can meet the challenges that might occur after the next election.

For defence planners, too, an ADF must demonstrate not merely a range and sufficiency of capabilities in an unpredictable world but must also be flexible, sustainable and adaptable. Flexibility is an intellectual quality, the ability of planners and commanders at all levels to respond in a timely way to the unexpected. Intelligence, however effective, will not always predict how an adversary will attack or how our government will respond; after all, surprise is an element that all commanders seek for themselves and therefore should expect from an adversary. Basing defence planning on a range of contingency plans is useful but does risk our being taken by surprise.

A sustainable force is one that can be maintained on operations and can deal with the losses that inevitably occur, especially early in a conflict. The presumption that defence need not be funded until a threat becomes apparent is the trap that threatens sustainability. This was the populist view that took Australia into two world wars plus conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan with small and ill-equipped armed forces. Supported by the myth that Australians are naturally the best soldiers in the world, it ignores the reality that it took at least three years in both world wars to build a well-trained army and that it would take longer in today’s more complex military environment. In the Second World War the Royal Australian Navy did not reach its peak strength until June 30, 1945, less than two months before the end of a six-year war for which Australia was ill-prepared. We are unlikely to face another six-year world war, but Australian forces have been actively engaged in combat or constabulary operations virtually constantly since 1989, with a heavy burden being borne by the army’s special forces, the navy’s surface forces and the air force transport squadrons. These generate considerable wear and tear on equipment, not to say on the personnel and their families. The monetary cost of deployments to Afghanistan and East Timor alone now exceed $12 billion and, at least in Afghanistan, for no noticeable or even expected benefit.

An adaptable force is one whose elements can meet a range of challenges rather than be overly specialised. For maritime operations, adequate naval surface forces constitute the core of an adaptable force that can engage in sustained combat against hostile forces, can interdict an adversary’s maritime trade, can protect our trade, can provide fire support in littoral areas and can transport ground forces complete with their equipment—and can do all these things over great distances. Other force elements from the navy or air force can only supplement these efforts.

So what about submarines? A considerable amount of public speculation has indicated a range of options but little has been said to justify even the 2009 white paper decision to acquire twelve vessels by 2030 or even whether submarines are in fact a necessary force element. Surprisingly given the cost and complexity of such a force, the white paper itself is generally silent on these aspects.

Submarines certainly have several important functions in maritime defence, and the Royal Australian Navy has deployed six since the late 1960s. The challenge for Australia’s naval planners is to acquire a submarine type with oceanic range as befits a maritime nation. Australia’s maritime responsibilities extend broadly from the Equator to Antarctica and from middle of the Indian Ocean to the International Dateline. In a conflict situation, deploying submarines to do no more than secure the approaches to Australia’s principal ports itself demands long range and extended time on patrol. A more assertive strategy requires submarines that can deploy to and remain on patrol at the very least close to the maritime choke-points through which merchant and naval traffic move. These choke-points include at least the passages through the Indonesian and Melanesian archipelagos.

The white paper lists a range of tasks for an Australian submarine force without justifying some of the claims made. Obviously submarines can play a role in the three primary elements of a maritime strategy: sea denial, sea control and sea assertion. Sea denial is aimed at preventing an adversary from operating in Australian waters; sea control seeks to prevent an adversary from using the sea in support of his own interests; sea assertion seeks to use the sea for the application of force to a hostile territory. The limited white paper discussion contains elements of all three roles for an Australian submarine force.

Clearly submarine operations represent substantial added value to military operations in defence of Australian interests. They pose a significant threat to an adversary because of their ability to operate covertly against hostile shipping, both military and merchant. Their capacity for covert operations can support intelligence gathering while their mere existence can have useful deterrent effects. On the other hand, they are not a substitute for adequate surface or air forces. Indeed some of the claims made do not bear scrutiny. The white paper places some emphasis on the ability of a submarine force to carry out strategic strikes using submarine-launched land attack or cruise missiles. Similar claims were made for the RAAF’s old F-111 force. There may certainly be value in an occasional attack of this kind but its effectiveness will always be limited. Certainly the missiles are accurate, provided there is accurate intelligence on the precise location of the targets. Even so the capacity of a small force to mount a weight of attack that can cripple an adversary is highly questionable. Moreover, a submarine-based attack force must make the long return to base for re-ammunitioning. Effective strategic strike is a function of large and capable forces such as those of the United States. To suggest that Australia can play an effective role in strategic strike is simply pretentious.

The United States Navy uses submarines to provide covert anti-submarine escort for surface forces and Australian submarines are expected to do the same. Caution should be exercised. The Americans use nuclear attack submarines for this role but the non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines operated by Australia would be much less effective. While their relatively high submerged speed would ensure their ability to manoeuvre around a surface force, they are not able to sustain the speed of a surface force because they must reduce speed to charge batteries.

The choice for a second-generation Collins-class submarine for Australia is limited. Most diesel-electric submarines in the world have too short a range to be suitable for Australia even for the very limited sea denial role. The choice then is between a large locally designed and built diesel-electric boat or a nuclear-powered type like the US Virginia-class or the British Astute boat. Selection of a nuclear-powered vessel makes considerable sense but the obstacles are formidable. Apart from the fact that the navy would need to develop a domestic nuclear engineering capability where none exists in Australia, the predictably hysterical political uproar would intimidate even the most determined Australian politician. Suggestions have been made that Australia lease Virginia-class boats from the US Navy with Americans providing maintenance support. The political obstacles are unlikely to be overcome and the RAN would still need to provide, presumably with American assistance, a high level of nuclear engineering skill in the navy simply to operate such vessels. Some day Australia will be compelled for the sake of reality to deal with its nuclear bogey but the time is not yet.

Which leaves the local contender, the as-yet-undefined son-of-Collins project, as the only option if the navy is to operate submarines. The Collins-class boats have had a chequered history since they began to enter service in the late 1990s. To be fair, too much was expected of what was a radical and new engineering capability in Australia and a great range of difficulties had to be overcome. For a new-generation boat, much will have been learned from the Collins experience. At least, one hopes so.

There is of course one other option—to abandon submarines as a force element. I would not advocate that, but some will. The government, the department, the shipbuilders and the navy need to sell the case for submarines much more effectively, to debate the issues in public and free from the special pleading that has characterised much of the discussion so far.

Even the decision to acquire twelve boats needs to be justified. For one thing, given that it’s exactly twice the number we have at present, there is a suspicion that the figure has been pulled out of a hat. What contributes to a degree of cynicism about that is that the navy has experienced considerable difficulty, despite a range of inducements, in crewing the six we have.

A submarine force of twelve boats would, in the absence of a decision to increase the size of our surface force, lead to a significant imbalance in naval capability. Submarines are sexy but they cannot replace surface ships for many of the tasks carried out by navies, especially in situations short of war where naval forces are critically the policemen of the oceans. In a tense international situation, submarines are valuable for the uncertainty they create, but surface forces by their known presence can be a force for stability, especially in support of friends or neutrals. Counting major combatants, Australia has one submarine for 2.5 surface ships. Excluding ballistic missile submarines, the United States ratio is 1 to 1.7, Britain’s 1 to 3, and Japan’s 1 to 2.5. If Australia were to acquire twelve new submarines with no increase in surface combatant numbers, the ratio would become 1 to 1.25, a significant distortion for a maritime force. The white paper does note somewhat vaguely that we would acquire new surface ships in the future but there is no commitment to an increase in numbers or even a one-for-one replacement of vessels going out of service.

In other fields, the RAN has fourteen patrol vessels used in peacetime primarily for sovereignty patrols in Australia’s territorial and exclusive economic zones. They have the most limited combat capability and in time of war would be used for coastal or local area security. A further twenty-two vessels, including two large amphibious ships under construction, provide resupply, hydrographic and amphibious support capabilities.

For the other services, the RAAF has, after many delays, finally achieved a degree of balance with its still small combat force of F/A-18A Hornet fighters supported by airborne early warning and control aircraft and tankers that can support all the combat aircraft in its inventory. These tankers and AEWC aircraft provide the air force with much longer range and effectiveness for its operations either independently or in support of surface forces. The RAAF has acquired twenty-four F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft to replace the F-111 strike aircraft that are too old and expensive to support. The Super Hornets are intended to provide an interim capability pending the arrival of up to 100 F-35 stealth fighters. The project has been delayed by problems with the aircraft’s development in the United States. Theoretically, Australia is not committed beyond acquiring fourteen aircraft with subsequent acquisitions depending upon satisfactory performance of the first batch of aircraft. Development problems mean that this first batch will be delivered no sooner than 2017 and very possibly later if at all.

The other core element of the RAAF is the P-3C Orion anti-submarine and patrol aircraft in service now for more than forty years. Substantially upgraded over the years, the Orions also have a useful anti-shipping capability. The RAAF also operates the Heron unmanned aircraft for battlefield reconnaissance and may acquire the much longer range Global Hawk UAV.

Elements of the Army have been constantly engaged in active operations overseas since 1989. While many of the deployments were to so-called peacekeeping operations, all included a level of risk. In recent years deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have been largely restricted to special forces units and some combat engineers. The rest of the Army has been engaged in an extensive reorganisation to fit it for overseas deployments. Despite the public discussion that almost invariably focuses on big-ticket equipment items such as ships and aircraft, the Army is the most expensive of the three services because of the high cost of military personnel. Typically personnel costs account for between 40 and 50 per cent of the defence budget. The Army has more people than the other two services combined but still too few to sustain more than a single brigade on operations. Typically, a recent excess of personnel numbers over the approved level resulted in “moves to correct the over-achievement” according to the Portfolio Budget Statement.

One element of the defence budget cuts affecting the Army is the scrapping of a project to replace its towed artillery with self-propelled and armoured guns. On a modern battlefield against a sophisticated adversary, self-propelled and armoured guns are practically essential for survival against air attack or counter-battery fire.

Ultimately Australia is maintaining an ADF that, in terms of large-scale conflict or multi-national commitments, is no more than a supplement to the US military. In Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed in Vietnam, Australia’s commitments were no more than token, with the bulk of the defence force kept at home. Cynics might suggest that such deployments, however highly capable at unit and individual level, contribute little more than a possibly adequate insurance premium on the American alliance. At a lesser level the ADF is a force that is intended for smaller-scale, generally low-intensity conflicts where the demand on the nation’s manpower and money will be limited for political rather than strategic reasons. Despite the modernisation programs and all the associated hype, the ADF is small and, up to a point, capable, but the capability does not extend to an ability to sustain extended operations. This limitation is even more significant because of our inability to provide adequate supplies of ammunition, spare parts and platforms from Australian sources. In the context of America’s fiscal problems and domestic pressure to reduce its military commitments, Australia could not maintain a strategically necessary capability at a sustained expenditure level of less than 2.5 per cent of GDP. The current defence budget suggests a government that has neither interest, understanding nor commitment to national security.