Reforming Defence

SIR: As a junior officer reading John Donovan’s article on “Reforming Defence” (April 2008), I am not surprised that the proportion of officers in the ADF has risen from well under 20 per cent to nearer 25 per cent. In many places it seems that every second person has a commission. It is not a simple case of too many chiefs without enough Indians, but it is hard to get around the mathematics of the situation, in that each officer has less man-hours available for tasking. Each junior officer, that is—at the policymaking level the relevant minions are staff officers, which may help to explain a few things.

A decade ago the ADF was not designed to conduct operations; Australia was (to borrow a phrase regarded as a standing joke at lower levels, but possibly still taken seriously in Canberra) “fitted for but not with” a defence force. There was consequently little need for operational- level staff, and members were “double-hatted” with peacetime and wartime roles. Apparently it was thought that the daily business which otherwise kept people occupied would become less important, or could be suspended, if real bullets started flying. Perhaps planners were inspired by the Six Day War.

In any case, this arrangement satisfied the need to find annual financial efficiencies while maintaining a comprehensive diagram of units and potential capabilities to show politicians and the public. That many of the units existed on a mutually exclusive basis and the capabilities required a warning time that no intelligence system (or indeed security environment) could possibly deliver was beside the point. The sword which threatens our defence force most is Occam’s Razor.

The advent of real operations inevitably placed strain on this system. In the final analysis, it is officers who answer for any given box in the system diagram, and so their numbers can only be cut to a certain point without affecting it; erosion of other-ranks support can be papered over, as a section of twelve, six or less can still be called a section.

With real operations came the need for real operational headquarters. In addition, a notable consequence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” is an increased demand for staff and technical work. My own specialisation is one which is usually among the first to be mentioned in relation to the RMA, the War on Terror and other catchphrases. The staffing shortfalls here, as in many other officer categories, are severe at both junior and middle levels (the deficiency in the Navy, in particular, is a scandal with strategic consequences). In many areas it is the norm for junior officers to fill positions designated for a higher rank while still under-trained in their current rank.

One development which makes great sense in the modern ADF is the establishment of a Joint Operations Command as a virtual fourth service, whose specialisation is dealing with real-world operations. I would, however, venture to suggest that establishing a new service might require more ADF members, rather than less. Matthew French, Sydney, NSW.