The Logical Limit of Rights to Abortion

Proponents of unlimited abortion rights typically claim that a foetus is not of the same moral kind as an adult human being because “potential” conscious agency is relevantly different from “actual” conscious agency. Here I examine some logical implications of this distinction and show that the claim of moral status of fully-fledged human beings is defensible only if all stages of human development following conception are of the same moral kind, irrespective of differences in the degree of moral status. As a consequence, permissibility of abortion should not be regarded as a licence to disrespect or devalue any stage of human development, either in the debate about abortion or in the clinical practice of abortion. I propose a hybrid account of moral status, taking into account the essential natural capacities of human beings, any developed capacities and the ethical quality of their discretionary use as a justification for asymmetric distribution of rights, without…