The Thinking of a Postmodern Warlord

In 2008 Vladimir Putin provoked a war with Georgia by giving its president, Mikhail Sakashvili, the poisoned choice either of losing two “breakaway” regions of his country to pro-Russian separatists and Russian “peacekeepers” illegally present there or of risking an attempt to recover them by military action. Sakashvili chose the second course—which was also a Russian trap—and was defeated. Russian troops advanced to within twenty-five kilometres of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, where they halted and have remained.

John O’Sullivan appears in every Quadrant.
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At that time I was the executive editor of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague which broadcast to twenty-two countries in twenty-eight languages. Our Georgian service was an especially influential one with first-class journalists in Prague and Tbilisi. I took the crisis as a chance to visit the Tbilisi bureau, and after a few days of meeting local politicians, diplomats, economists and journalists, I set down my thoughts in a commentary for RFE/RL’s English language service.

My first thoughts, slightly abridged here, were that the Russo-Georgian war was a very postmodern experience.


Tbilisi, August 2008. Seated in an open-air restaurant overlooking the Mtkvari River, enjoying a light lunch of mountain trout and Georgian salad, one finds it hard to believe that Russian tanks are only about twenty-five kilometres away—indeed that they may be even closer by the time the Turkish coffee arrives.

Tbilisi has few signs of being a capital city at war. National flags hang from many buildings. Newspapers have emphatic anti-Russian headlines such as “Peacekeepers Go Home”. Some pavement satirist has sprayed the features of Vladimir Putin on the pathways so that pedestrians tread on his face.

But there are no bomb shelters; no one looks up anxiously at the sky when a plane is heard; and refugees head into the capital from South Ossetia for help rather than away from it in panic.

This postmodern invasion looks very different to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia forty years ago. In 1968, Soviet tanks reached the centre of Prague. Today, Russian tanks seem to be going back and forth around major Georgian towns, but they will not head straight for Tbilisi without an additional (and highly improbable) Georgian provocation. In 1968, Czech leaders of the Prague Spring were rounded up and deported, reappearing years later as gardeners and furnace-men. Today, Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, addresses large anti-Russian allies in the capital and hosts visits from Western leaders. In 1968, the Soviet invasion was a “multinational” one drawn from the entire USSR and Eastern Europe; today, most members of the CIS have either criticised the Russian invasion or remained silent.

Soviet Russia in 1968 had to make a fairly simple calculation. It had to weigh the preservation of its power over Eastern Europe against the value of political and economic detente with America. It chose the former, calculating that the United States would restore detente from a mixture of self-interest and moral weakness after an interval. And that is what happened.

Two weeks ago, the authoritarian Russia of Vladimir Putin had a much more complex problem to solve. Its war aims were to “punish” Georgia for seeking to join NATO (and for being noisily pro-West in general); to warn other ex-colonies such as Ukraine and Poland not to follow Georgia down the same path; to establish de facto control over all the energy pipelines going from Central Asia to Western Europe; and to translate its new-style geo-economic power into old-style geo-political power. But the Kremlin wanted these results without (a) damaging Russia’s access to Western markets and investment; (b) undermining good diplomatic relations with the West; (c) provoking Eastern and Western Europe into safeguarding their interests against newly visible Russian threats; and (d) infringing international norms too blatantly.

Hence the Kremlin needed a pretext, a respectable war aim, and a satisfactory media “narrative” for its nice little war. Saakashvili provided the first by allowing the Georgian forces to respond to shelling with a full-scale military assault. [The Kremlin’s professed] war aim was the defence of South Ossetia and its peacekeepers which in theory limited the geographical reach of Russia’s advance. Russia’s official media catered to the third necessity by accusing the Georgians of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”—genocide justifies intervention under international law—while the fog of war was still thick on the battlefield.

If this narrative had stuck, Russia might have prevailed morally in diplomatic debate as well as militarily in the locality. But it was contradicted too plainly by the reality of a massive, planned Russian invasion. And as the media uncovered more and more of this reality—symbolised by Russian forces moving out of some towns but digging in elsewhere on Georgian territory—so the boomerang effects of the Russian intervention began to appear: Poland signed a deal to accept US missile defences, and Ukraine offered its own interceptors for the missile-defence system; investors began to take their money out of Russia; Western leaders turned up in Tbilisi pledging eventual admission into NATO; a NATO summit ended “business as usual” co-operation with Russia as long as the Georgia crisis persisted; and Russian diplomats at the United Nations and elsewhere had to fend off charges of barely concealed aggression.

None of these reactions will continue or bear fruit in the form of changed Russian behaviour unless the West remains united. And that raises a larger question about contending forces in global politics.

Two recent books—The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, and The Return of History and the End of Dreams by Robert Kagan—have argued persuasively that instead of an essentially peaceful world of co-operative democracies, we face a new struggle, global and ideological, between the Western democracies and self-confident and economically successful authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

In fact, as the crisis revealed, the “Western democracies” were not one camp but two. Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Ukraine and the United States wanted clear support for Georgia, its early entry into NATO, condemnation of Russian aggression, and the threat of strong penalties—such as exclusion of Russia from the Group of Eight (G8)—if the Kremlin maintained its hard line.

On the other hand, France, Germany, Benelux, Spain and Italy wanted a softer policy, avoiding condemnation of Russia or measures such as exclusion from the G8, in order to keep Russia engaged with the West. (British policy sought a third way, being pro-Georgian but not anti-Russian—in short, a typical British muddle—but London is likely to drift in the direction of the US-New Europe camp in practice.)

That division within Europe overlaps heavily with an ideological distinction stressed by Kagan in an earlier book: those who see a need for sovereign states and military power (and so are NATO-minded) versus those who believe that “lawfare” has replaced warfare in a world of soft power, global rules and supranational bodies (and so look to the European Union as their main security provider.) If so, then the world is really in a three-way struggle between authoritarians, national democrats and global legalists.

But the odd thing is that when the crisis broke, those who rushed to defend the new international norms were not the global legalists but the national democrats—in particular, the leaders of Poland and the Baltic states who came to Tbilisi to show solidarity with the Georgians (as shortly afterwards did the British Tory leader David Cameron).

The global legalists were very quiet about Russia’s breaking of the rules. The EU mission to Moscow led by Nicolas Sarkozy operated on the premise that it was necessary to avoid condemning Russia in order to be a successful mediator. Yet Sarkozy and his EU team were bamboozled by the Russians into accepting and promoting a cease-fire agreement that contained loopholes through which the Russians drove entire tank battalions. And that diplomatic failure was made easier precisely because the Russians were not put in the dock.

In the end, the EU argument that pooling sovereignty leads to greater real power proved to be a sham—and worse than a sham. It led in practice to collective impotence and self-deception. And there is a reason why that will always happen.

Global legalism rests upon the delusion that powers with the ability to assert their interest in some vital matter can be prevented from doing so solely by rules in which every state has a modest long-term theoretical investment. But as soon as a real crisis erupts—and Georgia was certainly such a crisis—the global legalists realise that their legal restraints are incapable of restraining the rule-breaker. In order to maintain their legalist fiction, therefore, they have to deny or obfuscate the fact that the rules have been broken or that any particular state is responsible for the conflict.

If they have to take sides, they tend to support the stronger power since that makes it easier to solve the dispute in a way that seemingly conforms to the rules. Might is cloaked with Right in order to save the blushes of the “international community”. If the rules are to have real impact, they must be backed by more than a legalist fiction.

In the Georgia crisis those nation-states and international bodies that defended the global rules effectively, that condemned Russia for breaking them, and that used the soft power of public diplomacy to restore their effectiveness were all forces that could ultimately call on hard power or serious national self-interest to support their words. Practitioners of hard power were able to use soft power; advocates of soft power ended up wielding no power at all.

Neither NATO nor the EU covered itself with glory in this crisis. But the EU actively appeased Russia, while NATO at least resisted feebly. NATO can exert real pressure on Russia, in part because it disposes of real military power, in part because it includes states, notably Poland, that have a real stake in Russia not winning outright in Georgia.

Moreover, Poland and its “New Europe” allies have an additional motive for their defence of Georgia. They are still conscious of the value of their own democratic sovereignty—hence respectful of other sovereign democracies. More elderly democracies in Western Europe seem to have forgotten the pleasures of self-government.

This postmodern war still continues. Yet it has already proven a great deal: the limits of military power in Russia’s case, the limits of soft power in Europe’s case, and the emptiness of global legalism without roots in real nations, real interests, and real democratic accountability.


THAT’S how my commentary ended in August 2008. Alas, the first thing to be said in response to it is that it underestimated the shrewdness of Putin’s calculation that the West would accept his victory in Georgia and return to business-as-usual after a brief diplomatic resistance.

While Putin saw that military power had limits in the Georgia crisis, he also realised it could be a decisive part of an overall military-cum-diplomatic strategy that exploited the self-deceiving desire of his opponents for a quiet life. He could strike, halt and propose negotiations—or even just wait for the West to do so.

Not only did he learn that lesson in 2008, he also applied it six years later in 2014 when he assisted two Eastern Russian-speaking regions to break away from Ukraine and annexed Crimea in a series of “salami tactics” that never provoked the West openly enough to make it oppose him. Quite the reverse. Between 2014 and 2022 most NATO countries continued two policies—starving defence forces of money and increasing their dependence on Russian energy—that made it almost impossible for them to envisage resisting any future Russian aggression. And when President Trump asked them explicitly to change these policies, he was dismissed as a dangerous clown.

All in all, if Putin had continued along this cautious zig-zag path, he might well have got the Ukrainian neutrality and the weakened NATO he wanted without arousing the West to serious resistance. But he forgot the limits of military power, became too confident of his own strategic genius, and staked all on a blitzkrieg to seize Kyiv and occupy Ukraine.

At that point everything apparently changed. All the NATO countries united around a common policy that Putin’s aggressive war must be resisted, and Ukraine must be helped both directly by supplies of advanced weaponry and indirectly by economic and energy sanctions.

The three-way world struggle between authoritarians, national democrats and global legalists that we saw in 2008 was still very much in being. But China, though Putin’s authoritarian ally, seemed to be sitting this one out as a mildly interested spectator. As for the NATO-minded national democrats and EU-minded global legalists, though both were singing the same pro-Ukrainian song, they lined up slightly differently from 2008.

The national democrats had gained recruits—with earlier members like the US, Poland, most of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics being joined by Spain, the Netherlands, and new recruits like Finland and Sweden frightened into applying for NATO membership by Putin’s brutal invasion. They are a more powerful faction than before. And this time the Brits (liberated by Brexit to make their own foreign policy) are playing a leading and energetic role alongside the US in drumming up serious military and diplomatic support for Ukraine.

That leaves Germany, France, Italy and Hungary (an uncomfortable recruit to the EU-minded global legalist camp) offering slightly different degrees of resistance to a strong anti-Russian policy. As in 2008 under Sarkozy, France under Macron sought to negotiate Putin out of a jam but failed. Germany consistently seeks to dilute the energy sanctions on Russia, inviting the charge that it is paying for Putin’s Ukraine. And Hungary—playing interference for Germany rather than for Russia—has alienated Poland, its closest partner in Central Europe, by its tepid support for Ukraine.

Those divisions do not exhaust the diplomatic and ideological differences in the Euro-Atlantic world over Ukraine. At a time when NATO is seeking to unify Europe’s response to the Ukraine crisis, the EU Commission is pushing ahead with “rule of law” penalties against both Poland and Hungary despite their joint acceptance of several million Ukrainian refugees. Likewise, the Biden State Department maintains a cold diplomacy towards both allies. An intellectually powerful movement in American conservatism, understandably reluctant to see America dragged into another European war, has translated this reluctance into angry hostility to Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy because his brave leadership attracts US public support. Some US foreign policy “realists” cling to Putin’s favourite historical theory that Ukraine is “not a real country”, which Ukrainians have conclusively disproved on the battlefield. Indeed, it’s not too much to argue that Ukraine is stimulating completely new partisan and philosophical divisions in both Europe and America.

Whatever the value of that sub specie aeternitatis, it’s a definite hindrance to NATO in its attempt to maintain united support for Ukraine. We can only hope that the Ukrainian army will rescue us all from these divisions and distractions, as—to our surprise—it has done so far.

Otherwise we seem likely to learn these very expensive lessons only in order to forget them.

21 thoughts on “The Thinking of a Postmodern Warlord

  • Botswana O'Hooligan says:

    Thank you Sir, most enlightening although might one who knows that neck of the woods somewhat ask you to elucidate us on why Poroshenko gave the speech he did (Donbas) in 2014 and followed it up with an an artillery barrage or two, and you might mention that President Putin advised those supposed dissidents not to have a so called referendum. You might mention the reigns of the past four Ukrainian Presidents and their shenanigans with the odd bit of loot, tho mind you President Putin is the creation of that nice Mr. Yeltsin who perhaps by accident (or by a Keating of superannuation scheme fame) created all the Oligarchs. Be even handed Sir for some old blokes who remember their great grandfather muttering “poor Mother Russia” when it turned out that 27 million of them died in WW2 ensuring none of us speak German or Japanese. You might also mention the USA fingers in the pie, you know, the perennial white hats.

  • Sindri says:

    It’s going to be fascinating, in a morbid kind of way, to hear Putin’s drivel on Monday justifying his war, recycled Stalinist claptrap dusted off and delivered over Red Square. Appearing with him will be the lugubrious Lavrov and “General” Shogiu (who has no military experience at all). Neither of them has anywhere else to go, and will stand or fall with Putin. The only thing missing will be trilby hats.
    Lavrov, in particular, no doubt contemplates the fate of Tariq Aziz, who died while awaiting execution

  • rosross says:

    The real question is, how different would it all be if the Americans had not dragged their Nato lackeys along on a steady creep of aggression toward the Russians? Nothing happens in a vacuum and demonising Putin is to ignore the reality of history which created this war.

    As to the Ukrainian Army, it is basically an American/European army as it has been all along and they will be somewhat constrained in pushing the Ukrainians frontline to do their bidding while hiding the fact they are waging the war against Russia, or trying to – as they have been for decades.

    As noted political analysts have said, over those decades, the US has missed an opportunity to bring Russia into Europe following the fall of the Soviet Union and now have pushed Russia and China as well as India, closer together. Incompetence walking hand in hand with arrogance.

  • Brian Boru says:

    Yes there are always two sides.
    On one side you have a people and their children being killed in a most shocking atrocity. Their cities, their homes and their livelihoods shattered by bombs. Millions fleeing to an uncertain and perilous future.
    On the other side of the coin you have a tyrant directing the slaughter from the safety of his mansions. A Russian people beset by propaganda and hoodwinked into believing the tyrant whilst their young soldiers are being swallowed up by the grinder of war.
    And some here blame the first side. I do not agree.

  • rosross says:

    @Brian Boru,

    And you don’t think we are beset by propaganda? I am sure the Russians are lying but so are the Ukrainians and the Americans and Europeans. Who says Putin is a tyrant? From what I have read and experienced, and I spent a lot of time in Russia about 15 years ago, the Russians like Putin because he is a strong leader. Their history makes it natural, I am sure, for them to want a strong leader.

    And how many weep for the carnage in Ukraine and ignore it elsewhere? Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Palestine, Yemen …. American created slaughter.

    And please, if the Russians are so evil to wage this war to defend their borders, then how much more evil has it been for the US to wage, in fact, start wars, far, far from its borders and for Australia to take part in them? We have sent plenty of young soldiers as have the Americans, to be swallowed up by the grinder of war and for no just reason.

    Blame is pointless. Understanding is what matters and if the US and its Nato lackeys had not continued this creep toward Russia’s border, through Ukraine, this war would not have happened. Plenty of noted political analysts, including American, have said just that.

    Zelensky is a pawn and the Americans will fight to the last Ukrainian if they think they can wound Russia militarily. The Americans are feeding all of them into the grinder of war.

    Let us at least, share the blame around.

    Quote:Siding with Ukraine’s far-right, US sabotaged Zelensky’s mandate for peace
    In 2019, Zelensky was elected on an overwhelming mandate to make peace with Russia. As Stephen F. Cohen warned that year, the US chose to side with Ukraine’s far-right and fuel war.

    In using Ukraine to bleed Russia, the US has showcased its contempt for everything in Ukraine that it claims to defend, namely its democracy and security. By treating Ukraine as a depot for US weapons, the US has joined Ukrainian fascists in sabotaging the 2015 Minsk accords that could have put an end to the civil war triggered by a US-backed coup the year prior. Minsk called for granting Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population in the eastern Donbas limited autonomy and respect for their language. This prospect was a non-starter for the far-right nationalists and Nazis empowered by the 2014 US-backed Maidan coup.

    “The uncomfortable truth is that a sizeable portion of Kiev’s current government — and the protesters who brought it to power — are, indeed, fascists,” two specialists with prominent Western think tanks wrote in Foreign Policy in March 2014, one month after the coup.

    The fascists have blocked peace in the Donbas at every turn. When the Ukrainian government voted on a “special law” advancing the Minsk accords in August 2015, the Svoboda party and other far-right groups led violent clashes that killed three Ukrainian soldiers and left dozens wounded. Then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who had signed Minsk at a time when President Obama was resisting heavy bipartisan pressure to arm Ukraine, got the message and refused to uphold Ukraine’s end of the bargain.

    Source: Aaron Mate, Substack.

  • Brian Boru says:

    Innocent people and their children being killed in a most shocking atrocity. Their cities, their homes and their livelihoods shattered by bombs. Millions fleeing to an uncertain and perilous future.
    And somehow rosross seeks to justify this?
    No matter what the provocation, if there ever was any after separatists first resorted to arms, no doubt with Russian encouragement, the Russian action is a massive atrocity and out of all reasonable proportion.

  • rosross says:

    @ Brian Boru,

    You might need to grab a dictionary and look up the meanings of ‘justify’ and ‘explain.’ They are not the same thing. One can seek to understand a situation without justifying it.

    If we do not understand why such wars happen we can forget about ever preventing them. You take a black and white approach when life and war is always grey. Always. Which is the joy and gift of history.

    Who is to blame more?

    The Americans for pushing their Nato lackeys into a plan to encircle Russia and to weaken it?

    The Americans for getting the CIA involved in the 2014 coup to topple the democratically elected and pro-Russian President? At least half of Ukrainians did not support the Maidan coup.

    Nato for being too gutless to stand up for Europe and against the Americans?

    Zelensky for not having the courage to stick to the platform on which he was elected, negotiation with Russia, Minsk and resolution of Donbass?

    Zelensky for going along with his oligarch Minder? Then again, the ollie’s money got him there so hard.

    Zelensky for not standing up to the neo-nazi fascists who said they would kill him if he negotiated with Russia and worked for peace? Yep, another hard one, death is very final.

    Putin for finally doing what Russia said would be done if the US/Nato aggression creep did not stop?

    Russia for becoming more fearful of Western aggression, perhaps even paranoid, after the CIA-backed coup, the biolabs along their border, the US/Nato military training the Ukrainians, Ukraine saying it wanted to be nuclear-armed – yet another broken promise – another tricky one which, if you get it wrong means your country and your people are destroyed. Act now to avoid something worse was the Russian approach, just as it was the American approach when the Russians wanted a military base in Cuba.

    As you can see, if you were prepared to look, there is plenty of blame to go around. The Russian action is an atrocity but not as bad as US invasions of Iraq and Libya for instance. The Russian action is most certainly not out of reasonable proportions given the threat and certainly not compared to American wars waged in the Middle East, or Israel’s colonial war in Palestine and others.

    Unfortunately the Americans and their craven allies have set a precedent which even Russia’s actions in Ukraine do not match.

    And for what it is worth, I grieve for the suffering of the Ukrainians but no more than I grieve for the suffering of the Palestinians, Afghans, Iraqis, Libyans, Yemenis and many more.

  • rosross says:

    @Brian Boru,

    Just a question, but did you or do you post similar sentiments in regard to the death and suffering of Iraqis, Afghans, Libyans, Yemenis, Palestinians etc., all of whom are experiencing what they are because of US policy?

  • terenc5 says:

    Botswana, you didn’t mention that Russia/Stalin was prepared to sit back and supply Germany when they attacked Europe and only got involved when they were attacked. Russia did no one any favours except by accident. If not for lend-lease they would have lost anyway.

  • terenc5 says:

    Brian Boru, don’t bother with roross. He has all the intellectual and moral cowardice of your average lefty and an undeserved arrogance that makes reasoning futile, but amusing

  • terenc5 says:

    Brian Boru, don’t bother with roross. He has all the intellectual and moral cowardice of your average lefty and a absurd arrogance that makes reasoning futile, but amusing.

  • terenc5 says:

    Brian Boru, don’t bother trying to reason with roross, it’s futile

  • Brian Boru says:

    “The Russian action is an atrocity”, you got that right rosross. Thank you for agreeing with me on that. Explain or justify, it doesn’t change that fact.
    terenc5, thanks for your comments.

  • rosross says:

    @Brian Boru,

    And you agree with me that Americans committed and commit atrocities in Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan – such a long list.

    So we agree. However, you ignore my point that the Russians had/have justification which the Americans did not.

    We agree that war is an atrocity. We only disagree on the issue of how much or how little war can be justified. On which count, the Americans fail before Russia does.

  • rosross says:

    @Brian Boru,

    You might want to ponder still the meaning of explain and of justify.

    If someone kills another who has abused them for years, that is accepted in a court of law as an explanation.It is not to justify but it is accepted as a mitigating factor.

    If the Russians had not been ‘abused’ for years by US/Nato aggression, and the Ukrainians had not become involved in it, this war would not have happened.

    We do not justify the actions but if we are wise, we seek to understand them.

    If it were categorically established there was no such aggression, difficult since it is a matter of historical record, but anyway, if it were established then the Russians should be as roundly condemned as the Americans were for their atrocities in Iraq, based on lies about WMD’s. Oh, hang on, they were not roundly condemned.

    This is why justify and explain are so critical.

  • rosross says:


    Thank you for your ‘thoughts.’ However, it is a general rule that those who choose to attack the individual – ad hominem – are admitting they cannot mount a coherent rebuttal to what has been said. Thanks also for making that clear at least.

  • Brian Boru says:

    rosross says, “my point that the Russians had/have justification which the Americans did not”.
    Thank you for now agreeing with me that your point was to justify the Russian action. We are not here debating the rights or wrongs of American action but rather the atrocity that Russia has undertaken.

  • Sindri says:

    terenc5, I don’t think Rosross is a “leftie” (although it doesn’t matter much what label you attach). She certainly apes the whataboutery and mindless sloganeering of the left (“NATO lackeys”, “US/NATO aggression”, “CIA-backed coup”, along with all the ridiculous stuff about “biolabs on the border” (by which she apparently means bio-weapons factories) and the conspiracy theory about Zelensky being forced to do the bidding of “neo-nazi fascists”. In fact, all this sounds suspiciously like the sort of extreme-right guff served up by sites like Veterans Today, with a bit of RT thrown in for good measure. And when pressed for a justification of her preposterous statement that Australia and the US are more “authoritarian” than Russia or China, she cites the covid situation. You can of course be vehemently opposed to lockdowns and the like without making such a childishly hyperbolic statement. So yes, I think she’s at the other end of the spectrum – not, as I said, that it matters.

  • rosross says:

    @Brian Boru,

    We are debating the war in Ukraine and the Russian invasion and any common sense and intelligence would say that to do so coherently and with any level of understanding, we must strive to learn the why of the what in order to gain some understanding. Instead playing goodies and baddies like ten year olds.

    In a world of global power dynamics it is indeed foolishness to ignore the environment in which wars happen. As the Americans have set a precedent to invade at whim and fancy, far from their borders, then why would the Russians not act to literally defend their borders.

    We may debate the atrocity of war in general but to talk about the atrocities involved in this current war in Ukraine means one must, as balance, also look at the atrocities and wars created by those who are now condemning Russia. To paraphrase, in Christian terms – and no, I am not religious in any way but I do value the wisdom they all offer: Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother’s eye. — Matthew 7:1–5 KJV (Matthew 7:1–5

    In short, give their history and the atrocities they have committed and funded, the Americans and their craven lackeys have no right to condemn Russia as they do. Particularly since it is their actions, which laid the foundation for this war.

  • rosross says:


    Thank you for yet again making it clear you cannot mount a coherent rebuttal and my statements stand. At least we have that clear. Please make a note, when people resort to personal attacks – ad hominem – abusing the messenger and not addressing the message, they are admitting they are incapable of addressing the message and so, by default, the message stands while they fall.

    Such statements as yours reflect on you, not me.

    As to Leftie, Rightie, I dislike such categorical descriptions because they indicate a lack of intelligent thought. Life is not black and white or Left and Right and there are not baddies and goodies.

    For what it is worth, I have, in my time, been called a Tree-hugging Leftie wimp and a Red-Neck Right Winger so I figure I have most bases covered and am covering a broad spectrum. You should try it.

  • Brian Boru says:

    “Americans have set a precedent to invade at whim and fancy”, a gross exaggeration by rosross in her attempt to show Russia has valid reasons to bomb schools, hospitals, homes and apartments and drive about 6 million from their country.

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