Late last year, Senator Cory Bernardi published his first major work on political theory, illustrating his vision for a responsible, confident society and the governing principles that will be needed to foster it. The Conservative Revolution (Connor Court) was not intended to be a manifesto but has nevertheless been described as such since it was released for sale to the public.
Perhaps the greatest interest to students of politics and to the media was less the content of the volume as the visceral neck-twitching reaction to its public release. There is something to be said for the confidence of Bernardi’s critics who readily denounced the book without having read it. In some cases this was freely admitted, in others it was obvious from the confused commentary of journalists who either had no grasp of the varied subject matter under discussion or were motivated by a desire to misrepresent the author’s position. Prima facie, this suggests that Bernardi’s “sin” was not so much the book’s content itself, but the fact that he dared to oppose the leftist worldview on principle in a substantive, consistent and argued fashion.
Bernardi’s call for a “revolution” in conservative thinking indicated that this was not just another program to accommodate, deal with or get along with the status quo. It could be argued that the book’s importance can therefore be estimated as a function of its critics’ often irrational response to its very publication. However, an attempt to understand its potential importance for the future development of Australian conservatism cannot be made without first considering the circumstances in which the book was published, and this includes the wider context of right-of-centre politics throughout the Anglosphere. When Australia follows the trends of North America or Western Europe, they are often felt some years after they have already left an enduring mark on these our cousin societies of the West. Developments in United States or the United Kingdom are hardly oracular, but they can provide useful insights when speculating about our own future, and they can certainly be investigated when analysing similar developments here.
The rising sidestream
Several things immediately stand out as characteristic of the zeitgeist as we approach the second half of the second decade of this century: the first is the continuing ability of centre-right parties to win popular elections; the second is the groundswell of discontent among conservative or right-leaning voters with their elected government (especially governments with a “conservative” political identity) and these voters’ willingness to organise independently of the existing political establishment; the third is the apparent and increasing failure of trust among these dissenters towards the media commentariat and perhaps the democratic process itself.
On their own, these trends are not new. Given the two-party equilibrium that the British-derived political system provides, parties of the nominal right have always remained viable alternatives for government. And there has always been discontent and disillusionment among some sections of the voting public no matter which political faction is in government. Likewise, independent political agitation seems to have always peppered the political landscape.
However, what is unique in recent years is the intensity with which some of these characteristics have impacted on the electoral process. Although the UK “conservatives” have proven themselves still capable to securing government, it has been at the cost of their credibility as a sincere conservative political force. That failing has benefited some rivals on the electoral right, most notably the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as well as other militant grass-roots forces like the English Defence League or reactionary think-tanks such as the Traditional Britain Group. Whatever one may think of these rivals to the conservative mainstream, they are the product of substantial electoral disenfranchisement and are making their presence felt on the political landscape, as well as the street. In what should have been a resounding victory for David Cameron in 2010 instead had to be secured through an uncomfortable coalition deal with the Liberal Democrats to avoid the stasis of a hung parliament. The necessity of circumstance was not the only force behind the coalition: Cameron’s own brand of socially progressive conservatism no doubt facilitated this awkward marriage of convenience. Since then, the spectacular success of UKIP in the recent 2014 European parliamentary elections illustrates the mass public rejection of the Conservative Party as a clear electoral alternative to Labour and the general Left.
Similarly, the string of uninspiring Republican candidates in US presidential elections led to a decisive victory for one of America’s most counter-propositional presidents and his seemingly effortless re-election for a second term. As depressing as it may sound to the US conservative voter, that re-election can be interpreted not only as a vindication of the incumbent presidency, but as a popular condemnation of mainstream Republican politics. The most immediate result has been the Tea Party movement, an angry, decentralised and somewhat ideologically incoherent network of popular fronts, large sections of which have nevertheless been co-opted back into the mechanics of Republican party-politics. Neither the UK Conservatives nor the US Republicans seem to have learned much from the lessons of their mediocrity.
Much of what can be described as the “establishment conservative” mainstream appears to have effectively capitulated to the idea that so-called “progressive” initiatives are historically inevitable, despite the absurdity of many leftist programs and their long-term unsustainability. Today, elected officials of the nominal right seldom speak out against even the most lunatic excesses of the Soixanthuitards, or oppose any policy that can be logically traced to their ideology and its underlying theories. Those who do, as Bernardi did in September 2012, can expect effective political excommunication. To the self-proclaimed “moderates”, controversy only gets in the way of governance; difficult questions are avoided; in political strategy and policy formation, pragmatism replaces appeals to ontological truth. “Ideas, in the Tory vision, are fleeting by-products of the social and political process, which are no sooner produced than forgotten,” writes British philosopher Roger Scruton in Gentle Regrets (2005). Consequently, “the Tory Party behaves as though Marx were its principal mentor: it treats philosophy as ‘ideology’, and economics as the motor of social life”. The ideology of course is the eternally optimistic Whig-materialist view of history wholly detached from any additional (or what ought to be essential) “particularist” considerations: those rooted in the concerns of a particular people living in a specific place and time who give rise to a unique culture.
Differences between mainstream political parties vying for public office therefore concentrate on managerial issues and the trivialities of administration, while the major points of “philosophical” controversy are argued according to terms on which there is essential bi-partisan agreement: progress as a function of material achievement alone, appeals to the lowest common denominator in cultural review, rampant egalitarianism at any and all cost, man as fungible quantity, and so forth. The theology of cultural Marxism goes unopposed. “Remember how conservatives use to laugh at and rail at political correctness?” asked US conservative activist Elizabeth Wright in September 2010. “Now, they’re the ones who don’t want to be depicted as ‘incorrect’.” Such a mindset renders an authentic conservatism largely impossible—that is, a conservatism driven by principle, not merely an attitude to preserve the status quo by streamlining the achievements of yesteryear’s radical vanguard. Indeed, the “establicon” boast at being the most competent at managerial efficiency and fiscal economism actually underscores its fundamental incompetence at reversing the leftist advance in the cultural arena. This of course makes the mainstream “Right” no less an obstacle to halting leftist advance than the official leftists they purportedly oppose. As Fabian Tassano comments in Mediocracy (2006):
The true test of an ideology’s hegemony is the degree to which its enemies feel they can criticise it only on its terms, or oppose it only by relinquishing their original principles. In this way, mediocracy’s would-be opponents become implicit defenders of the status quo.
It does not take a stretch of the imagination to understand why establishment conservatism has largely lost the Culture Wars, even if it does not (or refuses to) realise it. Indeed, it is perhaps this defeat which feeds the lack of faith and dampens the assertiveness of conservatives in modern political discourse. Moreover, the evident lack of faith may be interpreted as a collective subconscious admission of ultimate failure in the face of an energised opponent’s incessant agitation in the cultural arena. There being no effective voice of opposition to leftist advance, the electoral centre drifts towards the point of greatest gravitational pull: progressivism. Thus, as the “mainstream” parties of the centre-right court electoral support among this ever-leftward-shifting political centre, those who do not accept the inevitability of the progressive worldview withdraw into the periphery, and as is often the case, radicalise on their journey. Yesteryear’s honest conservative becomes today’s “reactionary” almost by default. As a result, much of what passes for robust and principled opposition to cultural Marxism today seems to come from outside the political establishment: the Sidestream.
This reactionary trend has created fertile ground for a host of political sub-currents on the right which explicitly identify away from what has come to characterise mainline conservative politics. Indeed, “conservative” and “conservatism” as political descriptors are becoming increasingly unpopular within what John Derbyshire designates as a broader “Dissident Right”. This is particularly true among the young members of what is sometimes also referred to as the “Orthosphere” (perhaps best exemplified by the work of James Kalb) or the “Neo Reactionary” movement (chiefly popularised by the work of Curtis Yarvin). Their critique has gone beyond that of paleoconservatives, who see the contest within the political establishment as a battle between two wings of liberalism: laissez faire, globalist neo-liberalism on the nominal Right and statist, neo-Marxist social democracy on the Left, both of which paleoconservatives view as corrosive to traditional society and the complex identities and liberties of its constituents. Neo-reactionaries of the Orthosphere broadly agree with this assessment, however they seem to be forming a critique of modern liberalism that is both oppositional to the status quo as much as it also affirms a positive worldview centred on notions of traditional identity. Some of these notions involve a regionalist local patriotism and the celebration of men and women as distinct, complementary sexes. This “identitarian” view is favoured over the abstract universalism of utopian “one-worlders” who see everything traditionalists value as mere “social constructs” to be bureaucratically redesigned at will.
In the face of the continued betrayal and repudiation of policies once held as cornerstone articles of faith among old-school conservative theorists, these dissidents of the right are too cynical and disillusioned to give “official” conservatives the benefit of the doubt any longer. Their critique of contemporary society is framed in a vernacular particular to this pessimistic worldview. The term “The Cathedral”, for example, refers to the framework of educational institutions, the media-entertainment complex, the major political parties and pop-cultural celebrities, among which all discourse occurs on social, political and cultural issues (the social pressures of political correctness within the private sector, coupled with legislative overreach, place it within this framework as well). The result is that all discourse is saturated with “progressive” ideology and its assumptions, making authentic challenges to the zeitgeist impossible for fear of reprisal. Political defeat, being ostracised from “polite society”, loss of career and reputation: these are the consequences any individual can expect to suffer to varying degrees for expressing views deemed heretical by contemporary liberal sensibilities.
It is arguable whether the growth of this exotic hothouse of alternative rightist tendencies is merely an illusion made possible by the expansion of independent blogs and online social networks. However, these networks are certainly increasingly sophisticated and rely on a discourse based on a growing body of formally published and often peer-reviewed literature. While unsavoury elements will naturally be attracted to this exciting and often excitable milieu, that tendency is not exclusive to either end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, no longer are debates within the Orthosphere limited to the virtual matrix of blogs and websites alone. Face-to-face meetings, regular conferences and periodic symposia are becoming more common. This is evidence of an undercurrent of political energy seeking release not only outside mainstream political discourse, but also outside the transient and ephemeral nature of online “virtual reality”. The electoral outcomes of the US and European elections also suggest that there is something tangible about this phenomenon, which may leave a lasting impact.
So far, we have focused on the experience of the Sidestream in the USA and the UK. The dissident Right in other parts of the Anglosphere is certainly more pronounced than it is here, but for that reason it offers a clearer subject for observation and comparison to the situation in Australia. What will be suggested below is that Cory Bernardi has become the most visible figure of dissent in Australian establishment conservatism, but with one important difference: whereas the dissenting Right in other Anglosphere jurisdictions emanates from outside officialdom, here it appears to have focused around an elected politician within the ranks of one of the two major political blocs. Bernardi’s unapologetic stance on “Culture War” matters has made him a maverick even in the eyes of some of his colleagues in the Coalition government. Although Tony Abbott— the bête noire of Australia’s broad Left—was elected Prime Minister on the wave of what this journal described in its September 2010 issue as our “Tea Party Moment”, certain actions taken by him or his administration since then can only be described delicately as somewhat counter-propositional from a traditionalist conservative perspective. Similarly, the Prime Minister publically distanced himself from the author of The Conservative Revolution just as the flurry of denunciations on the Left began to dominate the news cycle following its publication. In fact the first major public support for Bernardi came from John Madigan, senator for Victoria of the Democratic Labour Party.
On one interpretation, it seems that Abbott has generally sought his opponents’ electoral approval by repudiating or “sanitising” his image as a social conservative. Perhaps this may make sense in terms of realpolitik, if electoral victory is the ultimate and sole criterion of success; however the outcome of this strategy is uncertain. Such moves affect how he is perceived by his own conservative support base, and that may account for some of the losses in his nationwide approval rating over the last year. Meanwhile, and in lieu of any similar UKIP-style minor parties or local rightist pressure groups capable of influencing mainstream political debate from the outside, Bernardi has become something of a figurehead or symbol of traditionalist resistance or projection within the political establishment. This makes the senator an epicentre of Sidestream political thought and activity, however inside mainstream political structures. His position in parliament is therefore unique. It also creates a strategic opportunity for him to shape the general development of Australian conservatism for the next quarter-century. Electoral victory may not necessarily be his criterion of success, but much as Barry Goldwater in the 1960s set the tone of the later Reagan administration, Bernardi may become something of an Australian pioneer of a rejuvenated conservative charge on the political centre, effectively redefining or at least energising the right in public debate and policy analysis.
What follows is a discussion of two examples of one of the defining characteristics of dissident Right discourse, elements of which can be found in The Conservative Revolution: the importance of identity-related issues to Western cultural reconstruction. These only constitute a small part of Bernardi’s thesis, but a part which is perhaps most readily contrasted to mainstream conservatism. The examples will be compared to similar concepts which have been the subject of debate within the US and Western European Orthosphere and “independent Right” circles. It should be stressed that Bernardi does not explicitly identify himself as part of a Sidestream, and the terms used above do not feature in his book. Likewise, many of the authorities below are not cited in his bibliography; these authorities are used here to clarify and develop the themes addressed in the book. The analysis which follows is my interpretation of these issues, their importance and role in the potential evolution of Australian rightist politics over the next two to three decades.
Identity: Man and his role in society
Cory Bernardi is perhaps the only elected politician in Australia who will address the issue of sex and gender from an explicitly non-feminist position. This is extraordinary in an environment where almost all social policy which does or can touch upon gender is filtered through the women-first impulses of the mass media and political class. Thus, while health and education are the two most obvious areas where men and boys are experiencing a slow-burn crisis (pet areas of leftist policy interest, incidentally) periodic lip service is perhaps the best they can hope for. Nevertheless, Bernardi addresses the underlying issues from which the more statistically observable problems may arise, such as the status and importance of male identity in contemporary society. Consider this comment:
Historically the male role has been seen to be one of protector and breadwinner. In many instances they have also served as the authority figure within a household. This is not “oppression”, it is a core responsibility … There is a strength and value that comes with this male heritage, a strength and value that benefits society even today. Although the particular tasks undertaken by men have changed over the centuries and millennia, all communities benefit from having uniquely male qualities which can be called upon when the circumstances require it. This male heritage contributes to a sense of identity among men. We can see how undermining this identity among young men today leads to a distorted, caricaturised, poorly developed and misguided sense of manhood. Strong, centred men will create strong and stable societies; the alternative is the moral chaos we see around us today.
The above extract is located in the section concerning the traditional family unit, and the functions that each member plays in creating this safe, cohesive and therefore prosperous microcosm of society. While Bernardi’s observations generally reflect an existing political attitude where matters that concern men and boys are almost always discussed in reference to women, girls or the family unit itself, he nevertheless dares to place men at the centre of attention; he also departs from the lazy moralism of some commentators who prefer to demand that men “man up” in the face of social crises which are perceived to be a function of men’s failure to discharge duties towards their spouses and children. Bernardi’s thesis is therefore genuinely counter-revolutionary because it contradicts the reigning attitude. Note his identification of authority with a paternal obligation to serve, and the rejection of the cultural Marxist proposition that this is merely a veil for the authoritarian oppression of an allegedly disenfranchised class; note also the acknowledgment of the inherent value of unique masculine qualities which exist not as a “social construct” but which reflect a universal archetype or natural order: Bernardi writes, “Such specialised roles were common across different cultures and nations and in many instances continue today, albeit in very different circumstances.” In other words, there is a certain archetype of manliness which is not merely a product of ideology; the place of men in all social settings reflects an essence which is timeless and not subject to the experiments of social engineers.
Most significantly, in highlighting male identity as important and valuable to all members of society, Bernardi traces much of the social pathology that characterises modern liberal hedonistic culture as a direct result of the systematic undermining of its traditional paradigm (the paradigm being a system of normative relationships between the sexes and the attitudes of each sex to the society in which they live). The concluding sentence in the above extract illustrates the ultimately negative impact that this undermining has not only on men themselves, but society as a whole.
Bernardi is not alone in believing that the distortion in the contemporary idea of manliness has contributed to the destabilisation of the broader community. The interrelationship between male identity and male culture, particularly its deterioration since the “liberation” of women from the traditional system of obligations between prospective husbands and wives, has been discussed and critiqued by various observers across the Right-conservative spectrum for almost a century. Exploring some of these in reference to Bernardi’s argument may provide further clarity as to how this system has been failing, and what we are to expect unless present trends are reversed.
In 1927 Anthony Ludovici wrote in Man: An Indictment about the corrupted type of chivalry that dominated English society. He described how deference showed by men to women under a traditional chivalric code results in a de facto exploitation of men because the conditions that defined the traditional paradigm no longer existed to legitimise the code in the first place. Deference to female need, which was expected to be given freely as an expression of male virtue, nevertheless had to be repaid with some congruent response on part of the woman for the social system to work. Ludovici wrote that the break in this relationship, coupled with the residue of individual male altruism, resulted in “a curious survival of the idea of chivalry which is at once a distortion and a travesty of its original character”. Ludovici refers to the loss of male authority (not to be confused with power) which is the contingent condition for the obligations of chivalry to arise. Authority is one of the characteristics of manliness recognised by Bernardi as well. Neither Bernardi nor Ludovici argue that all men must be leaders at all times; what is being suggested here is an archetype of personality to which men strive, that in turn becomes an ideal according to which self-worth can be measured and derived. A failure to respect that archetype is perhaps the most important condition for the traditional male identity to erode over time.
In lieu of the necessary female deference which rationalises male chivalry, Ludovici concludes that the only way that the man can “extricate himself from this dilemma” is to renounce responsibility over that for which he is called upon to be chivalric. The successive renouncing of responsibility corresponds with the eventual repudiation of traditional male identity—the death of chivalry understood as one side of a reciprocal relationship. Remaining are the residual aspects of manliness devoid of the civilising effect of a traditional outlook, resulting in a recrudescence towards barbarism. This recrudescence is itself reinforced in a social and political environment where progress is measured almost entirely in materialist terms. As Julius Evola put it in his last major work of political criticism, Ride the Tiger (2003), male status has been “reduced to a moneymaking machine, a busy professional, and the like” or in other words, contemporary man has had all of his higher qualities eradicated through the adoption of a “demythologised” view of personal worth and identity, where the traditional archetype is uprooted in favour of an emasculated model of manhood. Here too, the blame seems to be placed on the idea that the sexes are fungible and lack any particular essence, so that the “renunciation of a woman’s right to be a woman” (that is, the necessary congruent response of women towards male chivalry mentioned above) consequently has obvious correlative effects on man as well. Evola is one of the more influential exponents of the “Traditionalist School” which has a strong following within the neo-reactionary Sidestream. Ride the Tiger was written for the “differentiated man”, or one who rejects the banalities of the modern world but still chooses to participate in it. However, what Evola illustrates in his section on the relationship between men and women in the modern world is that it has become increasingly difficult for men to live virtuous lives as the mainstream increasingly capitulates to progressive demands. This is echoed almost half a century later by Fabian Tassano:
With the traditional markers of maleness—responsibility, heroism, status—dismissed or belittled, the principal criterion of masculinity becomes sexual achievement, and the principal source of shame lack of sexual proficiency.
This is a large part of the “distorted, caricaturised, poorly developed and misguided sense of manhood” that Bernardi identifies among young men today. More could of course be said of the degeneration of masculine culture, such as the almost intentional de-intellectualised savagery that appears to increasingly characterise “macho” identity. What can be inferred from Ludovici and Evola’s views is that the orthodox concept of chivalry creates a largely selfless culture in which virtuous leadership is intimately connected to the authoritative stewardship of the community. However, where one part of the system is “liberated” from the contingent obligations, the other’s role in the system becomes effectively irrational, and thus the system fails. The unintended consequence of “liberating” women from their traditional identity has been a parallel shedding of traditional obligations inherent in orthodox masculine identity as well. This barbarisation of men was explored as a function of the liberalisation of female sexual behaviour in the remarkably frank report, “The New Dating Game”, by Charlotte Allen in the Weekly Standard of February 15, 2010. Allen’s arguments can hardly be described as diatribes of the religious Right. She wrote:
Evolutionary psychology also provides support for a truth universally denied: Women crave dominant men. And it seems that where men are forbidden to dominate in a socially beneficial way—as husbands and fathers, for example—women will seek out assertive, self-confident men whose displays of power aren’t so socially beneficial. This game of sexual Whack-a-Mole is played regularly these days in a culture that, starting with children’s books and moving up through films and television, targets as oppressors and mocks as bumblers the entire male sex … Not surprisingly, given that “head of the household” is a phrase that cannot be uttered in today’s egalitarian homes, many women satisfy their yearning for dominance by throwing themselves at bad boys or even worse.
Nevertheless, social conservatives still trapped in those caricaturised notions of chivalry routinely urge young men to “man up” and do what is expected of them by society at large, while feminists (of both genders and across the entire political spectrum) continue to undermine the only conditions under which the notion of male duty is in fact relevant. The failure of mainstream conservative leaders to acknowledge that decay within male culture is arguably traced to the pressures of feminist militancy, and their inability to confront this problem at its source, are evidence of either these conservatives’ blindness or an overwhelming fear of their ideological opponents. It also demonstrates the extent to which the principles of yesteryear’s social radicalism have been accommodated into contemporary political norms even on the nominal Right.
Either way, it should be no surprise that many of the young men discussed above reject a proposed social order which requires strict compliance with a growing body of sometimes contradictory rules and social customs, but which young women can break at any time—indeed breaking these rules is largely part of their “liberation” from alleged patriarchal oppression and traditional social expectations. Women’s transgressions are cheered, men’s condemned. That this attitude has been thoroughly normalised is evidenced by comments such as those of journalist Rita Pahani who recently declared in the Sun Herald (June 16, 2014) that “I don’t want to be treated like your equal. No! I want to be treated much better than you”, adding that this “should be the ideal all women strive for in life”. In her fashionable view, masculinity should be primarily characterised by indiscriminate and unqualified deference which “hardly counts as an act of chivalry; it should be a societal expectation”. While it’s heartening that the revolution hasn’t discarded all societal expectations, nevertheless the blatant moral solipsism on display here is breathtaking.
“The great wailing we hear and read from women is less about current social implications and more about having the 30-year social program of feminization being exposed for what it truly was and now is,” writes Rollo Tomassi in The Rational Male (2013). Furthermore, “For all the crowning and publicity of feminine triumphalism, there’s still a wonderment at why men are less and less motivated to play along in their feminine reality.” The reason why Rita Pahani’s nonsense can be published without any meaningful criticism or rebuttal is because, according to Tomassi, “women [and society at large] live and operate in gender assumptions that they simply take as normalized conditions”. The consequence is that many men find such a game unattractive and stop playing altogether. Indeed, Ludovici claims that the expectation that men adhere to their bargain without the reciprocal arrangement “is a sign of mental softening” presumably because it denies men a specifically masculine dignity.
This denial of dignity naturally follows the ideological assault on orthodox male identity, which can itself be interpreted on a basic level as an attack on the very essence of what it means to be a man. The pervasiveness of misandry in modern Western society is analysed in the work of Paul Nathenson and Katherine Young, who write in Spreading Misandry (2001), “Identity is a real problem for males, and trivialising it will do nothing to help either men or the women who are part of their lives.” This must be emphasised: the trivialisation of men will have serious and severe consequences particularly for women of the future.
Compare the behaviour of men on the sinking Titanic with the Costa Concordia shipping disaster a century later. Helen Smith discussed this at some length in Men on Strike (2013). The issues are the same that Bernardi identifies: the crisis of masculinity as one of the obstacles to cultural restoration. The second-last chapter of her work, titled “Why it matters”, opens with a long quote from an article originally published in National Review by Rich Lowry in which he described the disturbing testimony of one of the Australian female survivors of the Costa Concordia. The survivor explains how she witnessed male passengers scramble to the lifeboats, violently pushing people aside and trampling women and children on the way. Contrasting this to the conduct of the male passengers of the Titanic, Lowry suggests that the stampede on the Costa Concordia was evidence of the death of chivalry and a failure of manhood. Smith disagrees. Instead, she sees the behaviour of the men on the sinking cruise liner as a capitulation to society’s incessant degradation of the traditional masculine archetype:
Men have been listening to what society has been saying about them for more than forty years; they are perverts, wimps, cowards, assholes, jerks, good-for-nothing, bumbling deadbeats and expendable. Men got the message; now they are acting accordingly … So now people are surprised when men are heading for the exits? They shouldn’t be surprised. Men have been pushed there for some time. We should actually be surprised that it has taken so long.
As intimated earlier, the victims of course are women and children. An important lesson that can be inferred from Bernardi’s extract above is that no policy that is genuinely friendly to the family has any chance of success if it focuses on the family in the abstract or obsesses about women and children while being silent on, or hostile towards, the interests of men. In terms common within neo-reactionary circles, it is men who have historically created the social conditions within which it is safe for women to be women, and in which family formation can occur; the success and prosperity of women and the raising of children therefore become ultimately (perhaps even primarily) dependent on the success and security of men. No idea could be more heretical in today’s politically correct climate. Yet thankfully, there are heretics prepared to speak out. Jack Donovan, who writes about gender issues in the “alternative Right” online community, made this point bluntly in a cautious (if not entirely cynical) review of Smith’s book:
it is still mostly men who do the dirty work that makes the global economy—and presumably the air-conditioned corporate world where career gals are winning— possible. Bossy businesswomen like Sheryl Sandberg can “lean in” all they want, but you don’t see them jumping to do the dirty jobs with Mike Rowe.
We do not need anthropologists to study the social customs of the crew of a sinking cruise liner to see where current trends will lead. Sweden is perhaps the most progressive gynocentric social democracy in the Western world. Having incorporated the Siamese-twin ideology of feminist emancipation and the emasculation of its men within the framework of its social policy, Sweden has waged an official bureaucratic war against so-called “gender stereotypes” for many years. Today, Sweden is arguably one of the most un-patriarchal states in the world, and because this war against gender stereotypes tends to march hand-in-hand with the war against national identity, Sweden is therefore also one of the most multicultural and “inclusive” nations in Europe. It is no wonder that this society is an increasingly hostile environment in which to raise a young girl.
Indeed, should there be an iconic image of the dangers of the modern feminist delusion that emasculating men will somehow usher in a female-friendly utopia, it would have to be the face of “Linda”, victim of a violent pack rape in Gothenburg, whose bloody and battered visage occupied the front page of Sweden’s Expressen of March 26, 2005. What “Linda” and her friend “Jenny” suffered is no rare statistical outlier either. Reflecting on the rate of sexual assaults in Sweden and Norway, and considering specifically the vast over-representation of immigrants from the Near East and North Africa among the perpetrators of these crimes, it seems almost as if Swedish and Norwegian men have disappeared from the social environment altogether. Where is the leadership, the authority, the once uniquely masculine strength necessary to defend the most vulnerable in these oh-so progressive societies? Sadly, and as predicted, it is the first to disappear with the erasure of traditional male identity. Ironically, the first major victim appears to be the “empowered” Nordic woman. The consequence of this feminisation is that inherent female vulnerability becomes the universal characteristic of society as it encounters foreign cultures that do not embrace the progressive ideas on which liberal utopian notions depend. This brings us to the next identity-related issue from The Conservative Revolution: the significance of national identity in a globalising world where demographic trends are seeing the West’s share diminish with each passing generation.
Identity: The national question
Cory Bernardi’s critique of modern, atomised society is reinforced in large part by his warning over the loss of identity. Because the nature of a civilisation’s cultural output, its habits, customs, laws and institutions will all be shaped by the personality of its members, it stands to reason that any changes in the identity of its core constituents will affect the development of the national character as well as influence the evolution of its politics over time. The social revolution of the last half-century has had a lasting and detrimental impact on some of the West’s and our nation’s most enduring cultural icons.
The generation of 1968 in particular has been remarkably successful in passing on its ideology and worldview to those who followed its example, as well as to those who now accept the premises of that social revolution. Shadows of their inverted prejudice can be seen in the backdrop to cultural and political discourse today, which saturates culture and dictates the basic doctrines of both major party blocs. Objections to those doctrines are rarely if ever qualitative; rather, they address the grade at which it forms policy and the aggressiveness with which is it prosecuted. This has damaged the cultural confidence of Western societies who have uncritically embraced the legacy of last century’s social radicals. The “national question” is perhaps one of the most obvious examples.
Contemporary liberal sensibilities render the collective expression of national sentiment among the majority population of a Western society problematic at best: while “pride” is frequently used in the context of celebrating obscure sexual obsessions or buttressing the isolationist or ghetto tendencies of ethnic minority groups through ethnic councils, lobbies and the like, patriotic feeling among a Western host population is instead associated with “nativism”, “chauvinism” and “bigotry”. It is first pathologised through social stigma, and then criminalised through disingenuous “vilification” laws. In this context, it is understandable that critical assessments of immigration and citizenship policy are rarely popular among elected politicians, especially in officially multicultural democracies. Nevertheless, substantial attention is given in The Conservative Revolution to the issue of cultural compatibility (mostly in relation to Islam in Australia) and inferences can be drawn from this discussion about a hierarchy of values which may place the identity of the host above that of the newcomer. Under the doctrines of the modern liberal state, culturally absolutist and inegalitarian suggestions of this kind are impermissible.
Nevertheless, Bernardi makes it clear that a conservative government should not hesitate in being judgmental when asked to accommodate the exotic values and ideas of those wishing to join Australian society—the ultimate objective of this judgmentalism being to protect the social stability of the body politic. He writes, “If we insist on an unquestioning equivalence of ideas, we risk dismantling the traditions of our social estate.” There was a time when this was axiomatic; today however, it has become anathema in a political system premised on cultural relativism as a kind of crypto-virtue and radical egalitarianism as the highest good. Likewise, there was a time when pride could be found in the history of Australia’s early settlement and the composition and character of the settler classes. The climate which has been fostered by cultural Marxists over the last several decades has been one in which the foundational population of these colonies is looked upon with embarrassment if not outright shame and disgust. Yet it was this group of people who brought a particular culture which has been largely inherited by us today. In Culturism (2007) John Press puts it thus:
History creates peoples. The virtues and morals of these stories define a people … It is not a coincidence that all great civilizations have an intimate attachment to their own story and a side of the story they call their own.
Social conservatives who are solely preoccupied with moral controversies are here reminded that “virtues and morals” are intimately connected with the particular people that gave rise to them; it is the identity of these people which forms the bedrock of the national character and thus the ethos that governs the individual relations between its members. Press says, “Cultural resilience is greatly affected by the levels of pride and satisfaction that the culture engenders in the population.” A society that does not have such resilience will likely implode under the pressure of other groups whose cultural and political leaders are less affected by progressives’ relativistic attitudes. It is difficult to imagine a more fertile breeding ground for destructive social pathologies to emerge than one where a distinction is made between two groups along strictly identitarian grounds: by denying the collective heritage of one but encouraging another’s. While Bernardi rightly does not exclude the contributions of later settlers and immigrants to the development of Australian society, it was the early British colonists who set the framework around which modern Australian identity has developed. Slandering traditional “Anglo” identity is therefore an attack on the innermost core of Australian nationhood and will likely deliver a fatal blow to the nation’s “cultural resilience”. Consider the following extract from The Conservative Revolution:
Our nation was founded and has been shaped by these people. But it has also been shaped in recent times by those who have sought and found the freedom already established over two hundred years, without which the present society that has been built here would simply not be possible … while we are capable of embracing the new that can truly enrich us, we must constantly be mindful of the importance of a unified culture and the imperative to maintain it. No society can exist where its people live according to drastically differing norms and standards. Over time, such societies have been shown to polarise, fracture, and dissolve, sometimes violently. For these reasons, it is certainly not immoral to ensure that policy and law exists within a certain moral and historical framework … The purveyors of “multiculturalism” often forget that a strong identity is also essential for the descendants of our settlers and those who identify with their historical experience, so that society remains emotionally centred and develops a healthy patriotic instinct.
Given that some of the social pathologies that are discussed in The Conservative Revolution are significantly more pronounced in Western Europe, a brief digression about “identitarianism” may be in order. This political current has been recently popularised by Markus Willinger’s short volume Generation Identity (2013). Identitarianism is gaining momentum among the young exponents of the alternative and dissident Right, so far mainly in Europe. Judging from the grievances listed in Willinger’s work, identitarianism could be described as a reaction against the same forces of cultural dissolution which Bernardi sees as a potential threat to the stability and prosperity of Australian society as well.
The politics behind this reaction against the ideology of the Soixanthuitards forms part of the political theory of many right-wing parties whose popular support seems, at least in light of the recent European parliamentary election, to be on the ascent. This influence may represent the strength of the identitarian sentiment itself, and thus constitute a movement in its own right. Alternatively, it may be a symptom of an existing anxiety among a youth who reject the liberalism of the mainstream political establishment. Either way, its presence has demonstrated the relevance of identity issues in contemporary political discourse, particularly from the perspective of Europe’s native populations. This European development can provide important lessons for Australian cultural and political leaders who want to avoid the old continent’s social and demographic crises, and the political chaos which may follow.
There is of course a risk that this reaction can take sinister forms, as has the present multicultural hegemony. However, and despite the predictable slander of progressive commentators, these identitarians reject the authoritarianism of the early twentieth century just as vehemently as the “values” of modern liberal society. Willinger writes, “We reject its [fascism’s] ideology and hostility to the freedom and the diversity of peoples, just as we reject your ideology … We toss both it and your sick ideology where they belong, into the rubbish bin of history.” The “sick ideology” is seen as its equally toxic mirror image: a disingenuous multiculturalism which erodes the confidence of its host or eliminates it altogether, and a coercive and overbearingly moralistic political correctness which effectively becomes no less totalitarian in dealing with dissenters. Willinger writes:
for us, your multicultural society means nothing but hatred and violence. In the name of your “tolerance” you hunt down all who criticise you, and call those you hunt intolerant … Your delusions have only accomplished one thing: you have uprooted your children. … We must dig deep to find ourselves again. Our history, our homeland, and our culture give us what you have taken from us.
What is noteworthy here is that the reaction against the nominalist view of citizenship and nationality in particular has not degenerated into the racist thuggery of the “Hollywood bigot”. Instead, the utopian conceits from which European social democracies derive their moral credibility are rejected on the basis that their assumptions about human nature are fundamentally flawed and inherently destructive to the social fabric. To the identitarian, that social fabric ought to be organic, based on concrete local traditions, not the product of abstract theorising or what Roger Scruton elsewhere refers to as “unscrupulous optimism” which “does not count the cost of failure or imagine the worst-case scenario” but “imagines the best outcome and assumes that it need consider no other”. The sentiment expressed by these identitarians broadly echoes the same warnings encountered in The Conservative Revolution when identity-related issues are also raised: modern liberalism has become a type of living irony, hypocritical and self-contradictory. In appealing to politically correct morality for its public legitimacy, modern liberalism applies this morality selectively, thus showing illegitimacy even according to its own professed universal and egalitarian principles.
Bernardi touches on this theme when he alludes to the culture of indifference or open hostility to “the descendants of these early settlers or those who identify with their cultural and historical legacy”. Melbourne-based traditionalist commentator Mark Richardson illustrated this in his 2007 analysis of the internal contradictions and outright racism of so-called “Whiteness Studies”, the theoretical program of US radical academic Noel Ignatiev, which has unfortunately found favour in Australian universities in recent years. After discussing how the theoretical inconsistencies of this new “academic discipline” can only be reconciled if understood as a systematic and organised attack on all cultural products of European and European-derived populations, Richardson concludes, “Whiteness theorists are creating a picture of whites as a ‘cosmic enemy’: as a force in the world standing in the way of justice and equality.”
The ideas behind “Whiteness Studies” may be extreme, but they are the logical culmination of a general attitude displayed by progressive elites towards the symbols and myths which define Western civilisation and its history. “The sole emphasis on white privilege, in a diverse world in which that race is in headlong retreat,” writes Frank Salter in Quadrant’s November 2012 issue, “is difficult to distinguish from racial animus.” The reactionary element of identitarianism is a reaction against such animus, which is here masquerading as a kind of academic liberation theology for regime-endorsed protected groups. This hostility is also routinely encountered in a popular culture that celebrates multicultural “diversity” wherever and whenever possible, but excludes this one group as a unique group from that celebration. It is not surprising that this creates an ideological climate in which the supposed “oppressors” become vilified. Bernardi identifies:
the bigoted mindset where men or people of European descent are categorically denounced as historical “oppressors”. This mindset demands that they must have their opportunities limited and penalised by preferencing others in appointments, promotions, admissions and the like.
Here is liberalism’s selective application of its own moral pretentions. Such a system cannot exist for long before showing signs of internal failure and collapse. Just as deconstructing traditional male identity has led to moral chaos and a society which appears to be increasingly hostile to women, pathologising traditional national identities may have disastrous unintended consequences for both the host culture and the immigrant group alike. This pathologising influence can be traced to the relativistic attitudes which Roger Kimball refers to as the “multicultural ethos”, effectively resulting in a belief where “preferring one culture, intellectual heritage, or moral and social order to another is to be guilty of ethnocentrism and racism”.
Guillaume Faye, formerly an exponent of the French Nouvelle Droite, writes in Archaeofuturism (2010) that “according to the ruling ideology, everything European and rooted is perceived as being guilty and criminal. Guilty, that is, of being itself.” Reflecting on the aggressive promotion of this ethos by the ruling political elites in France, Faye goes so far as to coin the term ethnomasochism along with its corollary xenophilia as the default position of politicians, academics, media personalities and the like (“the Cathedral” of neo-reactionary parlance) whenever any question concerning traditional identity is raised on behalf of interests connected to the local or national heritage or legacy of Europeans or European civilisation itself. This is the “inverted prejudice” of the Soixanthuitards referred to earlier, a prejudice which Bernardi suggests has filtered into today’s mainstream. Kimball is no reactionary, “neo” or otherwise, but conservatives of all types should take note when the concerns of cultural traditionalists such as himself and commentators of the dissident Right such as Faye agree or appear to speak with one voice on an issue of pressing concern.
Some may dismiss these concerns as anachronistic and irrelevant, especially in a globalising world where the most common form of collective identity seems to be a standardised urban cosmopolitanism, shallow, uprooted and suffering from cultural amnesia. However, this synthetic and media-driven “identity” represents an infinitesimally small percentage of the global population, and one which is in rapid demographic decline. Moreover, experience suggests that the extent to which this vacuous “identity” is shared by newcomers to Western societies depends on their degree of cultural separation from Europe and its former empires or influences. Indeed, the native-born descendants of such immigrants tend to reject this vacuity for more atavistic identities and the extreme political ideologies that may accompany them (such as the terrorists responsible for the London tube bombings of July 7, 2005, or those who choose to fight in Middle Eastern conflicts today but who our media painfully insists on referring to as “Aussies”). Yet the “multicultural ethos” remains bi-partisan policy of all major party blocs whether in the official Left or the nominal Right, throughout the Western hemisphere; differences are again only differences of degree, not principle. Faye interprets this “egalitarian cosmopolitanism” as the ruling ideology of liberal modernity, which itself “tends to define a people as laios, a rootless mass of individuals coming from all different places”. There is no room under this paradigm for a particularist recognition of any one cultural tradition, least of all the tradition of European Man, and even less so the celebration of his very sense of unique “peoplehood”.
For the domestic policy analyst, the result of this liberal hypocrisy should be obvious: a “society” where certain groups are permitted strong identitarian attitudes but do not necessarily share in the historical legacies of the host, and a host which is effectively subordinated and deracinated of any sense of unique corporate personality. The problem here is that this represents a “society” which is divided by two diametrically opposed psychological forces, and it is difficult to imagine how this model can find a peaceful equilibrium. Unfortunately, civic patriotism and subscription identity do not seem to be an entirely viable solution. The number of urban no-go areas for the French police is now apparently counted in the hundreds. But the reason why the native constabulary is not welcome in the banlieue is not because they believe in the principles of the French Revolution, but because they look like the revolutionaries’ grandsons. Politicians of all political dispositions ignore this at their (and more importantly, their nations’) peril. Faye dramatically predicts that “the future which is inexorably looming near is reawakening ethnic loyalty and tribalism on both a local and a global scale”. This view is unfortunately consistent with the reality of many of the most heated conflicts in the world today. Recent historical precedent also suggests that such an alternative is indeed a more likely outcome.
Tomislav Sunić, Croatia’s former ambassador to the United Nations, claims in Post Mortem Report (2010) that the persistence of nationalism in Eastern Europe is an expression of “the will of different peoples to retrieve their national memories long suppressed by communism’s shallow universalism”. He warns about the dangers of “a global village that includes different ethnic parades—so long as they do not turn into military parades”. But of course that is precisely what happens when identity is suppressed, whether it is the coercive hand of the communist police state or the subtle and nuanced tyranny of Western political correctness. This is evidenced by the horrors of the 1990s Balkan conflicts and the race riots of Britain not a decade and a half later. It is also evidenced by the “flash mobs” and “knock out game” plaguing certain sections of US urban society, a phenomenon that the mainstream press seems reluctant even to acknowledge. If the liberal political classes are genuinely interested in fostering stable societies, these issues should be at the forefront of their minds. A realisation of the importance of a host culture’s identity may lead to the repudiation of the progressive assumptions which have been held with almost religious conviction by leftist demagogues for at least the last half-century. Repudiations at this stage would be an admission of failure on a profound level, and judging from the zeal at which liberal agendas continue to be prosecuted, such admissions are unlikely.
Yet the advanced level of existing social decay is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that identity politics among minority groups only is now the electoral reality of all major political parties, not just those on the multicultural vanguard. It is no secret that liberal immigration policies and official multiculturalism were pursued in the United Kingdom to undermine the cultural confidence of the British population and push traditional Tory conservatism into electoral irrelevance. Australian politicians have also felt the electoral impact of campaigning in a society whose host identity is weak while the cultural projection of minority ethnic groups is comparatively assertive. This was displayed by the Liberal Party’s ethnic preselection strategies for certain multicultural regions in the last federal election. To the bien-pensants of the multicultural state, this was an embarrassing admission that minority enclaves show such strong ethnocentric tendencies at the polling booth that this now has to be accommodated by politicians of the mainstream when seeking public office.
Despite the uncomfortable questions this raises for the future of representative government, why then is ethnocentrism seen as a uniquely European “sin” by the propagandists of Whiteness Studies and their fellow travellers on the race-huckster Left? The answer is simple: because their professed campaign against “hate” is merely a projection of their own prejudice against European civilisation and the very people who created it. It is precisely this attitude which has laid the groundwork for, as well as encouraged, the social trends and political consequences described above. Far from being the David to the establishment’s Goliath, these progressive ideologues have largely defined public debate on these issues. Outside their fantasy world, the evidence tells a different story: if European descendants can be described as having any ethnic pathology, it isn’t ethnocentrism but invisibility. This year, 2014, is the bicentenary of the death of the First Fleet’s Governor-Designate and the man who named our continent. So far, only Fred Nile of the Christian Democratic Party noted the occasion in a speech to the New South Wales state parliament. While no serious politician today would miss an Iftar dinner, none of the “conservative” governments in any of the states or the Commonwealth have so far deemed the Arthur Phillip bicentenary worthy of any high-profile event or function. And why would they—it’s not as if “the descendants of our settlers and those who identify with their historical experience” are the least bit perturbed by the omission, assuming they even noticed it in the first place.
John Press suggests that if responsible politicians want to avoid the nightmare scenarios prophesied by the Faye and Sunić, “a deeper understanding of founding myths” is required to “foster a deeper appreciation and attachment” to one’s civilisation. This necessarily means wholly rejecting the relativistic policies of multiculturalism, and re-emphasising the significance of Australia’s foundational heritage. This does not mean ignoring or demeaning the contributions of newcomers; it is merely a call to acknowledge the roots which nourish the essence of Australian nationhood. The alternative will lead to replicating, in our major cities, the chaos that can already be seen in many Western European metropolitan centres. It is difficult to imagine why the political class would favour pursuing the latter option, unless they were entirely driven by short-sighted electoral concerns and a disregard for the long-term viability of a stable and culturally healthy Australia, in which case, perhaps the dissident Right has a reason to be cynical about the state of conservative leadership within the West.
The publication of The Conservative Revolution was met by a flood of negative and disparaging commentary from the press, the Opposition and large sections of its author’s own governing party. The Amazon page under which the book remains available for sale was inundated with over 500 mocking and malicious reviews. Nevertheless, the immediate consequence of the media frenzy was enhanced sales which led to the book’s second printing. Almost as soon as this fact was reported, all discussion of the book in the major tabloids and broadsheets seemed to come to an abrupt halt. Obviously, and despite elite disapprobation, Bernardi’s thesis struck a chord among large section of the public. The fact that the message contained in this short volume appears to have resonated within the right-leaning electorate suggests that the senator’s work may have an impact on the development and evolution of Australian conservative thought. Slander and mockery having failed, his opponents appear to have resorted to “death by silence”. As the Sydney traditionalist commentator Luke Torrisi noted at the height of the media controversy:
The Progressive’s Totschweigtaktik is clearly under threat, and they want to renew its implementation before they are left standing in the room with an empty bag, a newly escaped cat and an elephant someone finally wants to say “hello” to.
The success of the Sidestream, whether it’s the US Tea Party, reactionary political groups in Europe, or the general growth of the online orthosphere, is fed by mainstream conservatism’s refusal to address certain controversies for fear of offending modern politically correct sensibilities. This desire to appease their opponents allows a more assertive Left to dictate the parameters of political debate. This failure of conservative politicians to speak up for what they believe demoralises grassroots electoral support and motivates conservative voters to stop supply at the next election. “Establicons” therefore have no one to blame but themselves for their inability to galvanise a right-leaning electoral base. This crisis of conservative politics is feeding the ideological volatility that mainstream politicians and other “moderates” profess a desire to avoid. English political philosopher John Gray notes in Black Mass (2007) that the splintering of “neo-conservative ideologues and paleo-conservative nativists” is partly symptomatic of this crisis:
The common factor in these disparate currents is that conservatism has ceased to be a coherent political project. The links it requires with the past have been severed. Any attempt to revive them can only be atavistic, and when conservative parties resist the temptation of reaction they become vehicles for a progressive agenda that easily degenerates into utopianism.
Neither the UK Tories under David Cameron nor US RINOs (Republicans In Name Only) offer an attractive model for the future of non-Left politics in the Anglosphere. Far from shunning him, Bernardi’s colleagues would do well to embrace his courage in taking the battle of ideas straight to the Left on civilisation-defining issues, while they prefer to tinker with the fleeting vicissitudes of state managerialism. The recent history of the Coalition suggests that it is more electorally competitive and enjoys greater public and grassroots respect when it projects the very conservatism that the public expects it to stand for, and when it opposes the post-, pseudo- and crypto-Marxism of Labor or the Greens as well as the lobby groups and think-tanks that inform their radical agendas. Far from being a liability, one can imagine that Bernardi’s courage has been a reason for traditionalist and conservative voters to remain within the Coalition tent at polling time.
Economic and fiscal reform may be important, but bean-counting ennui is hardly something that inspires a people. Whether a political movement is a party seeking office or a grass-roots organisation, it needs to inspire not only to survive but to succeed in the market place of ideas. If the Coalition’s base is something more than just a motley collection of anti-Labor interests, if it in fact represents something more than just an alternative style of governance, then politicians like Bernardi should be sought out, their principled opposition to modern liberalism fostered within party ranks, and their vision incorporated as an essential component of tomorrow’s political conservatism. Failure to do so will almost certainly result in their becoming “vehicles for a progressive agenda”, evidence of which can already be witnessed today.
Edwin Dyga is the Australian editor of the British Quarterly Review (quarterly-review.org) and the Convenor of the Sydney Traditionalist Forum (sydneytrads.com).
 Elizabeth Wright, “That Old Time Religion” Radix No. 1 (2012) p 213.
 See generally: John Derbyshire, From the Dissident Right (vDare Foundation, 2013).
 See generally: James Kalb, The Tyranny of Liberalism – Understanding and Overcoming Administered Freedom, Inquisitorial Tolerance, and Equality by Command (ISI, 2008) and Against Inclusiveness – How the Diversity Regime is Flattening America and What to Do About It (Angelica Press, 2013).
 See generally the following unpublished MS: Curtis Yarvin, An Open Letter to Open Minded Progressives (338 pages) and A Gentle Introduction to Unqualified Reservations (278 pages). These documents can be located at various neoreactionary blogs.
 For a general description of paleoconservative attitudes to governance, policy and its critique of neoconservatism in particular, see this writer’s review of Thomas Fleming’s Socialism (Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2008) in “We’re All Socialists Now” New Oxford Review 78:9 (November 2011) pp 38-42.
 Edwin Dyga, “Conservative Dissent in the Blogosphere” Quadrant 54:9 No. 469 (September 2010) specifically circa pp 46-47.
 Dan Harrison, “Bernardi comments dodged by PM” Canberra Times (7 January 2014) p 1.
 Dan Harrison, “Bernardi finds support” The Age (10 January 2014) p 7.
 Cory Bernardi The Conservative Revolution (Connor Court Press, 2013) pp 80-81.
 Ibid p 80.
 Anthony Ludovici (John V. Day, ed.) The Lost Philosopher: The Best of Anthony M. Ludovici (ETSF, 2003) p 145.
 Ibid p 146.
 Julius Evola, Ride the Tiger (Joscelyn Godwin and Constance Fontana trans., Inner Traditions International, 2003) p 186 [orig.: Cavalcare la Tigre (Edizioni Mediterranee, 1961)].
 Ibid p 203.
 Fabian Tassano op cit p 121.
 Charlotte Allen, “The New Dating Game” The Weekly Standard 15:21 (February 2010) p 24. See also the work of Frank Salter, specifically his “The War Against Human Nature II: Gender Studies” Quadrant 56:7-8 No. 488 (July-August 2012).
 Rita Panahi, “Equality is essential, but so is chivalry” Herald Sun (16 June 2014) p 22.
 Rollo Tomassi, The Rational Male (Counterflow, 2013) p 84.
 Ibid p 161.
 Anthony Ludovici op cit p 147.
 Paul Nathanson and Katherine Young, Spreading Misandry (McGill Queens, 2001) p 45.
 Helen Smith, Men on Strike (Encounter, 2013) pp 119-120.
 Ibid pp 120-121.
 Jack Donovan, “Are Men the New Mexicans? Pro-Male Feminists Are Still Feminists” Counter-Currents Publishing (28 March 2014) <www.counter-currents.com> (accessed 29 March 2014).
 Niclas Rislund, “Der slog och slog” Expressen online (26 March 2005) <www.expressen.se> (accessed 20 March 2014); Print edition not available to writer.
 See for example the following commentary within the rightist blogosphere: Bruce Bawer, “Scandinavian Rape, Scandinavian Blinkers” FrontPage Mag (22 August 2013) <www.frontpagemag.com> (accessed 7 July 2014); Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen, “Rapes in Sweden, Redux” Gates of Vienna (1 April 2014) <gatesofvienna.net> (accessed 28 March 2014).
 Cory Bernardi op cit p 132.
 John Press, Culturism – a Word, a Value, Our Future (Social Books, 2007) p 67.
 Ibid p 80.
 Cory Bernardi op cit pp 130-133.
 Markus Willinger, Generation Identity – A Declaration of War Against the ‘68ers (David Schreiber trans., Arktos, 2013) p 46 [orig.: Die Identiäre Generation (Arktos, 2013)].
 Ibid p 17.
 Roger Scruton, The Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope (Atlantic Books, 2010) pp 22-23.
 Cory Bernardi op cit p 130.
 Mark Richardson, “Guilt Inducement – Whiteness Studies” The Independent Australian (Autumn 2007) p 21.
 Frank Salter, “The War Against Human Nature III – Australia and the National Question – Part II: Race and the Nation in the Universities” Quadrant 56:11 No. 491 (November 2012) pp 39-40.
 Cory Bernardi op cit p 13 n 14.
 Roger Kimbal, Tenured Radicals – How Politics has Corrupted our Higher Education (Ivan R Dee, 1990) p 285.
 Guillaume Faye, Archaeofuturism – European Visions of a Post Catastrophic Age (Sergio Knipe trans., Arktos, 2010) p 181 [orig.: L’Archéofuturisme (L’Æncre, 1998)].
 Ibid p 80.
 Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe – Can Europe be the Same with Different People in it? (Penguin, 2010) p 117.
 Guillaume Faye op cit p 80.
 Tomislav Sunić, Postmortem Report – Cultural Examinations from Postmodernity (Wermod&Wermod, 2010) p 174. Emphasis added.
 Ibid p 176.
 Colin Flaherty, White Girl Bleed A Lot (WND Books, 2013) pp 106-109, 140-143, 228-234, 314-319.
 Simon Walters, “‘Dishonest’ Blaire and Straw accused of secret plan for multicultural UK” Mail on Sunday (25 October 2009) p 2; James Slack, “Labour censored crime factor migrant report” Daily Mail (28 October 2009) p 8; James Slack, “Exposed: Labour’s secret plot to make a multicultural UK” Daily Mail (10 February 2010) p 6.
 Steve Lewis, “Liberals swat the WASP” The Daily Telegraph (11 May 2013) pp 1, 7.
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 29 May 2014, p 29413 (The Hon. Rev. Fred Nile MLC).
 James Robertson, “Tony Abbott woos Sydney’s Muslims” Sydney Morning Herald online (5 August 2013) <www.smh.com.au> (accessed 2 July 2014). This report does not appear to have featured in the print edition of the tabloid.
 John Press op cit p 67.
 Although Amazon presumably has policies to deal with fraudulent reviewing of its content, the malicious entries in relation to The Conservative Revolution do not seem to have caused them much concern; as at the publication of this piece, they remain online. Inquiries have been met with silence.
 Luke Torrisi, “First ‘Shots Fired’ in Australia’s Culture War, 2014” SydneyTrads – Weblog of the Sydney Traditionalist Forum (12 January 2014) <sydneytrads.com> (accessed 30 June 2014).
 John N. Gray, Black Mass – Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (Farrar Straus Giroux, 2007) p 82.